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ABSTRACT
This article examines whether conservative critics are correct in their assertion that the Kansas
City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) desegregation plan clearly establishes that no 
correlation exists between funding and academic outcomes.  The first section provides a 
summary of public education in the KCMSD prior to 1977, the beginning of the Missouri v. 
Jenkins school desegregation litigation.  The second and third sections analyze whether the 
Jenkins desegregation and concurrent school finance litigation (Committee for Educational 
Equality v. State) addressed these problems.  The fourth section provides an overview of school 
finance litigation and explains how the KCMSD desegregation plan has been cited as proof by 
conservatives that no correlation exists between educational outcomes and academic 
performance.  The final section uses national and state level data on school funding and student 
outcomes to determine whether their assertions are correct.    
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1960s, plaintiffs have challenged the legality of school finance formulas in 
45 states.1  A number of courts that have invalidated their school finance systems have found that 
a correlation exists between educational funding and academic outcomes.  For example, in 
Montoy v. State, a Kansas trial court observed: 
In defense, Defendants simply argue “money doesn’t matter.”  Without regard to 
the constitutional mandate that there be adequate funds for a suitable education 
and that those funds be equitably divided, the defense seems to say: there is no 
correlation between spending and student learning, so what’s all the fuss.
“Money doesn’t matter?”  That dog won’t hunt in Dodge City!2
Conservative critics have countered that a school desegregation case, Missouri v. Jenkins, proves 
that no such correlation exists.  In this case, a federal district court held that the state of Missouri 
1
 ACCESS, Litigation, at http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/litigation.php3 (visited Feb. 20, 2006).  
2
 Montoy v. State, 2003 WL 22902963, at *40 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003).  See Section IV-A for a discussion of 
other cases that have found a correlation between funding and outcomes. 
3and the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) had operated a de jure segregated 
school system in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.3  A Wall Street Journal editorial
explained the application of the Jenkins case to school finance litigation in the following manner: 
Over the past two decades, courts in more than 30 states have intervened in 
education policy and ordered billions of dollars spent on schools in the name of 
boosting student performance and ensuring equitable financing.  The result has 
been an avalanche of new spending on inner city and rural schools, but, alas, not 
much measurable achievement by the kids who were supposed to be helped. 
In one of the most notorious cases, in Kansas City, Missouri in the 1980s, a judge 
issued an edict requiring a $1 billion tax hike to help the failing inner-city 
schools.  This raised expenditures to about $14,000 per student, or double the 
national average, but test cores continued to decline.  Even the judge later 
admitted that he had blundered.4
Robert Hardaway in an editorial published in the Denver Business Journal characterizes 
the KCMSD desegregation case in similar tones: 
The fact is that money is not, and never has been, the key to educational quality. 
In 1985 a federal judge in Kansas City, frustrated by the failure of court-mandated 
busing to integrate the public schools, ordered the creation of “magnet” schools. 
Tax increases of as much as 50 percent were ordered, and $1 billion was raised to 
increase teacher salaries and build lavish facilities, including, according to Time
magazine, “a new planetarium, an art gallery, television studios, therapeutic 
whirlpools and an Olympic-sized swimming pool with an underwater alcove so 
that coaches [could] film a diver’s technique.”  The predictable result?  Test 
scores declined, and racial discrimination intensified when minority students 
seeking admission to the magnet school were cruelly denied on grounds that their 
skin was the wrong color.  Outraged African-American parents later filed a 
complaint.5
3
 Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D.Mo. 1984).  
4 Texas School Lesson, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 29, 2005, at A18.  
5
 Robert Hardaway, Pouring Even More Money into Education the Wrong Approach for the United States, DENVER 
BUSINESS JOURNAL, Apr. 18, 1997, at http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/1997/04/21/editorial4.html 
(visited Feb. 28, 2006).  See also Lil Tuttle, Paying Private Prep School Prices for Public Schools, Claire Boothe 
Lee Policy Institute, at http://www.cblpolicyinstitute.org/privatepublic.htm (visited Feb. 22, 2006) (“The higher 
spending/higher achievement theory was put to its ultimate test in 1985 when a federal court ordered a complete 
overhaul of Kansas City’s public schools.”); Bob Caudle, Judges Make Poor Headmasters, THE MORNING NEWS, 
Nov. 6, 2005, at http://www.nwaonline.net/articles/2005/06/09/columns/bob_caudle/87bcaudle.prt (visited Feb. 22, 
2006);  (“Arkansans should take a lesson from what happened to the Kansas City School district when a federal 
judge intervened to ‘help’ the district with its teaching duties.”); Matthew J. Brouillette, The Case for Choice in 
Schooling: Restoring Parental Control of Education, Cascade Policy Institute, at
http://www.cascadepolicy.org/pdf/edref/I_118.pdf (visited Feb. 22, 2006) (“The Kansas City (Missouri) School 
District provides the perfect illustration of the inefficacy of increasing resources to improve academic and social 
4This article examines the KCMSD desegregation plan to determine whether it actually 
establishes that no correlation exists between funding and academic outcomes.  The first section 
provides a summary of public education in the KCMSD.  Specifically, we identify the 
organizational and funding problems that had a negative impact on the school district prior to 
1977, the beginning of the Jenkins litigation.  The second and third sections analyze whether the 
Jenkins desegregation and concurrent school finance litigation (Committee for Educational 
Equality v. State) addressed these problems.  
The fourth section provides an overview of school finance litigation and explains how the 
KCMSD desegregation plan has been cited as proof by conservatives that no correlation exists 
between educational outcomes and academic performance.  We explain that conservatives have 
based their critique on three premises: (1) the KCMSD received more money than other school 
districts over an extended period ; (2) the state of Missouri covered a disproportionate share of 
the costs of the desegregation plan, to the detriment of school districts throughout the rest of the 
state; and (3) the exorbitant spending on KCMSD was largely inefficient, leading to no 
improvement in educational outcomes.  The final section uses national and state level data on 
school funding and student outcomes to determine whether these premises are correct.    
outcomes.”); Executive Alert (July/August 1998), National Center for Policy Analysis, at
http://www.ncpa.org/sub/ea/1998/ea98d.pdf (visited Feb. 22, 2006) (“Kansas City, Mo., spent the past 12 years 
developing the best public school system money can buy,…on the premise that this would improve the education of 
black students in the district…But the results are dismal); Ron Goldfarb, It Is Not the Money, Parents & Schools 
Special Report, May 2000, at http://bcn.boulder.co.us/univ_school/psnews/pss0500.htm (visited Feb. 23, 2006) 
(“Blanket statements that you can fix public education by throwing money at it…remind me of the Kansas City, 
Missouri, school district.”); Anna B. Duff, Missouri School Board Gets Tough, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, Oct. 
28, 1999, at
http://www.nancypappas.com/Articles/School%20Construction/School%20Bond%20Construction/Two%20Billion
%20Failed%20To%20Improve%20Schools%20In%20Missouri.htm (visited Feb. 23, 2006) “Those who argue that 
what schools need in order to improve is more money may want to take a look at what happened in Kansas City, 
Mo., after an extra $2 billion was lavished on its school district over the past 15 years.”); Outraged African-
American parents later filed a complaint.”); The Cash Street Kids: Kansas City, Missouri Public School 
Performance Lags, 328 THE ECONOMIST 23 (1993), at
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=371074&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientId=9874&RQT=309&VName=PQD (visited 
Feb. 22, 2006) (The KCMSD desegregation plan “clearly underlines the lack of any simple relationship between 
spending more money and getting better results.”) 
5SECTION I:  OVERVIEW OF EDUCATION IN THE KCMSD PRIOR TO MISSOURI V. 
JENKINS AND COMMITTEE FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY
A.  Lay of the Land
The KCMSD is carved out of the two-state metropolitan area.  Figure 1 provides a 
geographic view of the Missouri side of the Kansas City metropolitan area, using demographic 
data, county, place and school district boundary data from the 2000 U.S. Census.  The city of 
Kansas City, Missouri is concentrated in two counties north and south of the Missouri river, with 
the center city and downtown areas concentrated in Jackson County, south of the river.  In the 
area south of the river, several school districts are carved partly and in some cases entirely out of 
the city limits.  Those districts include the KCMSD, Center School District, Raytown (partially), 
Grandview (partially), Hickman Mills and Lee’s Summit (overlapping a small corner of the city). 
The KCMSD also overlaps a portion of the city of Independence (Northeast corner of KCMSD). 
As can be seen in the right hand panel of Figure 1 and in Figure 2, zip codes in the core of 
Kansas City, Missouri are predominantly black (over 90%) and remain clearly bounded to the 
west and somewhat to the south and east by the formal boundaries of residential segregation. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 do not include Kansas zip codes adjacent to the west of Kansas 
City and Center school districts which were in the 1960s and remain today the most segregated –
white only – zip codes in the metropolitan area (in some cases less than ½ of 1% black). 
6Figure 1
School Districts in the Kansas City Metropolitan Area
School Districts & Incorporated Places School Districts & % Black by Zip Code
In 2000, the KCMSD remained approximately 70% black, while the resident population 
within the KCMSD boundaries is only about 42% black (2000 U.S. Census).  Figure 2 shows 
that the neighborhoods along the Kansas border, home to the original country club and shopping 
district, range from 2% to 17% black residents. 
Table 1 summarizes the racial and economic characteristics of major public school 
districts in the Kansas City metropolitan area.  Contiguous districts are noted with a Y.  Note that 
while white students and families did not migrate into the KCMSD, minority families have, over 
the past three decades, migrated into neighboring districts Center, Hickman Mills and Raytown. 
The geographic barrier that separates North Kansas City has been much less penetrable.  Even 
less penetrable is the state/county line that separates Johnson County, Kansas (Shawnee Mission, 
Blue Valley, Olathe). 
7Table 1
Characteristics of Districts Adjacent to KCMSD (1990 to 2000)


















Center MO JK Y 2,676 $33,455 $81,794 39.3% 2.2% 24.5%
Hickman Mills MO JK Y 7,304 $36,570 $64,629 51.1% 1.8% 23.1%
Independence MO JK Y 11,299 $34,257 $71,153 3.1% 2.5% 19.3%
North Kansas City MO CL Y 16,506 $40,589 $83,144 3.2% 2.5% 13.3%
Raytown MO JK Y 8,349 $37,264 $72,651 18.2% 1.9% 13.8%
Kansas City Missouri MO JK Y 36,645 $25,363 $50,174 69.4% 5.5% 52.3%
Lee's Summit MO JK 12,769 $59,671 $129,400 3.3% 1.4% 6.1%
Blue Springs MO JK 12,409 $56,409 $115,700 3.8% 2.1% 4.9%
Grandview MO JK 4,341 $38,972 $81,209 32.2% 2.1% 22.9%
Liberty School District MO CL 5,295 $47,727 $103,560 3.7% 1.4% 9.1%
Kansas City Kansas KS WY Y 21,743 $26,850 $43,750 52.2% 10.9% 55.0%
Shawnee Mission KS JO Y 31,334 $48,376 $114,699 3.4% 2.8% 7.8%
Blue Valley KS JO 12,648 $78,615 $196,611 1.7% 1.0% 1.3%
Olathe KS JO 17,072 $53,105 $117,201 4.4% 2.1% 8.1%
Piper KS WY 1,239 $57,316 $104,698 4.2% 3.3% 4.9%
Turner KS WY 3,958 $35,362 $55,052 9.2% 7.4% 30.5%
Data Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data, Fiscal-Nonfiscal Longitudinal File
B.  Population Trends
Many black families moved to Kansas City during the later nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries from rural areas because of the educational opportunities provided by the 
city.6  In 1869, the Kansas City school board opened Lincoln School for black elementary 
6 SHERRY L. SCHIRMER, A CITY DIVIDED: THE RACIAL LANDSCAPE OF KANSAS CITY, 1900-1960 31 (2002). A 
major reason for this phenomenon was that state constitutional provisions and legislation discouraged the provision 
of education for blacks in rural areas.  5 RICHARD S. KIRKENDALL, A HISTORY OF MISSOURI: 1919 TO 1953  (1986); 
GERALD W. HEANE+Y & SUSAN UCHITELLE, UNDENDING STRUGGLE: THE LONG ROAD TO AN EQUAL EDUCATION IN 
ST. LOUIS 59 (2004); W. Sherman Savage, Legal Provisions for Negro Schools in Missouri from 1865 to 1890, 16 J. 
OF NEGRO HIST. 309, 320 (1931).  In 1865, the state legislature required school boards to establish one or more 
schools for blacks when there were 20 or more black students within the school district.  Henry S. Williams, The 
Development of the Negro Public School System in Missouri, 5 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 137, 138 (1920).  If the averaged 
dropped below 12, then the school could be closed for up to six months.  Id.  In 1883, the legislature reduced the 
requisite number to 15.  Savage, Legal Provisions for Negro Schools in Missouri from 1865 to 1890, supra note 6, at 
316.  The law further stated that if the attendance of black students fell below 10, the school could be closed for up 
to six months.  Id. at 318.  In 1889, the legislature made it a crime for black and white children to be educated in the 
same schools.  Id. at 319.  This statute was enacted to prevent school districts with small black populations from 
operating integrated schools in violation of the 1875 constitutional provision mandating separate schools for whites 
and blacks.  HEANY & UCHITELLE, supra note 6, at 58.  These laws effectively prevented rural black children from 
obtaining an education because they lived in districts with very small black populations.  Savage, Legal Provisions 
for Negro Schools in Missouri from 1865 to 1890, supra note 6, at 320.  
8students.7  Between 1880 and 1889, the district opened five more black elementary schools and 
converted Lincoln into a secondary school in 1887.8  In 1885, two-thirds of the city’s black 
children were enrolled in its schools, as compared to less than one -half of the city’s white 
children.9  Two decades later, the percentage of black children who attended city schools had 
shrunk to a little more than half, but that percentage still exceeded that of white students who 
were enrolled.10  By 1940, 12 of the more than 60 schools in the segregated KCMSD served 
black students.11
The black population that was moving into the city was low-income and poorly educated, 
while the white population that was moving to the suburbs was better-educated and wealthier.12
In 1959, the median income for suburban residents was $6,828 compared to $5,906 for the 
central city.13  The median income for Central City’s non-white residents was $4,001.14
The state legislature subsequently enacted a variety of legislation designed to increase the educational opportunities 
for black children. For instance, in 1897, the state legislature authorized districts with a population of less than 25 
black children to join in order to secure enough children to have a school.  W. Sherman Savage, Legal Provisions for 
Negro Schools in Missouri from 1890 to 1935, 22 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 335, 338 (1937).  In 1907, the legislature 
permitted any district with less than 25 black children could send them to some other district if it did not wish to 
maintain a separate school.  Id.  In 1921, county and district boards were forced to pay the tuition to any community 
where a black school was located.  Id. at 340.  In 1929, the obligatory level of black children for the operation of 
school was lowered to eight.  Id. at 341.   However, these legislative amendments failed to significantly increase the 
educational opportunities offered to rural black children.  Id.
7 SCHIRMER, supra note 6, at 32.  
8 Id.
9 Id. at 31. 
10 Id. at 32.  
11
 Peter W. Moran, What's In a Name: Issues of Race, Gender, Culture, and Power in the Naming of Public School 
Buildings in Kansas City, Missouri, 1940-1995, 35 PLAN. & CHANGING 129, 130 (2004).  There was evidence that 
the black schools in the KCMSD were not equal to white schools.  In 1898, the pupil-teacher ratio for black schools 
was 65:1, or one-quarter higher than the ratio in schools for whites.  SCHIRMER, supra note 6, at 32.   In 1952, the 
Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Hobby v. Disman, 250 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1952) denied a write of mandamus 
to compel the transfer of black students from a black elementary school to white schools in the area due to the lack 
of equal educational facilities at the black school.  Although the court noted that the black elementary school lacked 
an auditorium and a cafeteria steam table and had a small playground and separate buildings, Id. at 139-40, it ruled 
that these shortcomings did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the black school’s facilities were 
“substantially equal” to those provided to white students.  Id. at 141. 
12 CLIFFORD HOOKER & VAN D. MUELLER, EQUAL TREATMENT TO EQUALS: A NEW STRUCTURE FOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS IN THE KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN AREAS 21 (1969) (ERIC Document Reproduction 
No. ED 042 233).   
13 Id. at 24.  
14 Id.
9According to the 1960 U.S. Census, 20.2% of the families living in the suburbs had incomes over 
$10,000, while 10.0% had incomes below $3,000.15  In contrast, 4.1% of the central city non-
white families had incomes over $10,000, while 36.5% had incomes below $3,000.16  According 
to data from 1965 individual income returns, 23.2% of the white families living in the Kansas 
City metropolitan area had income levels below $3,000.17  The percentage of non-white families 
living below the $3,000 income level was 51.7%.18  Furthermore, 86.7% of non-white families 
lived in poverty areas.19  According to the 1960 U.S. Census, 53.4% of the Kansas City 
suburbanites had completed high school as compared to 16.7% of central city non-whites.20
C.  School Finance Formulas and Organizational Structures
Missouri’s school finance system during the period before Jenkins relied heavily on local 
property taxation to fund public schools.21  In 1955, voters through a special referendum partially 
addressed the need for increased educational funding by approving a Foundation Program and a 
cigarette tax to fund it.22  School funds distributed through this program were divided into three 
categories: equalization, flat grant, and teacher allowance.23  To qualify for the first two 
categories, school districts were required to levy a one dollar school tax and operate their schools 
for 180 days with adequate attendance.24  The equalization program guaranteed poor school 
districts $130 per pupil and made up any differences between the local tax levy and that 
15 Id. at 23.  
16 Id.
17 Id. at 23.  
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 24.  
21 Id. at 28.  
22 EDWIN J. BENTON, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN MISSOURI, 1760-1964 101-02 (Ph.D. diss., St. Louis 
University, 1965).  
23 Id. at 102.  
24 Id.
10
amount.25  The flat grant payments came to $102 per pupil in average daily attendance.26  The 
school finance formula also included a teacher daily allotment, which was based on the college 
preparation of teachers.  While this allotment placed pressure on school districts to hire better 
qualified teachers, it also advantaged those districts that already employed  more highly qualified 
teachers.27
During the period prior to the Jenkins litigation, the KCMSD received more funding from 
the state’s school finance system than most school districts.  Our analyses of available data 
indicated that in 1968, the KCMSD was generating about $554 in local tax revenue per pupil and 
spending about $802 per pupil.  The KCMSD’s expenditures per pupil in average daily 
attendance were second highest in the state in 1968 among the relatively small sample of 32 
districts reporting, behind only one small rural district, and ahead of the two Kansas City metro 
area suburban districts reporting (Liberty & Clay County).28
Ironically, the KCMSD’s high standing may have been partly due to the strategically 
planned racial segregation within the city.  During the first half of the 20th century, several high 
value residential and commercial properties had been developed within the city’s and school 




28 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION  STATISTICS, ELEMENTARY AND 
SECONDARY GENERAL INFORMATION SYSTEM (ELSEGIS): PUBLIC ELEMENTARY-SECONDARY SCHOOL SYSTEMS 
FINANCES 1967-68  (1968).   Our analysis appears to contradict a 1969 report commissioned by the state legislature 
that advocated the consolidation of the KCMSD with the surrounding suburbs.  According to this report, in 1962, the 
suburbs had more than twice the resources ($126.33) available than Central City ($54.40).  HOOKER & MUELLER, 
supra note 12, at 27.  This report also asserted that in 1966, a direct relationship existed in the Kansas City 
metropolitan area between taxable wealth and per-pupil expenditures.  Id. It may have been possible that the 1969 
report may have adopted the incorrect assumption that the Kansas City metropolitan area consisted of an 
underfunded core surrounded by more affluent and affluent white suburbs.  Unlike many eastern states at the time, 
Kansas City’s own boundaries were relatively sprawling and suburban growth had yet to fully take off, with the 
exception of development across the state line. 
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the city remained almost entirely white, but the presence of these areas within the school district 
boundaries provided some strength to the school district’s property wealth base.  
Unfortunately for the KCMSD, these areas of the city are immediately adjacent to the 
state line with Kansas, where, through the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, state, local and county 
officials were more complicit to continued racially restricted real estate development.  Further, 
ample land was available in Kansas.  The next wave of stately mansions would be built on the 
Kansas side of the state line, and eventually the racially restricted country club would be moved 
as well. 
It is also important to note that even though the KCMSD had more money available to it 
than the surrounding suburbs, there was evidence that the state’s funding system may have been 
insufficient to meet the needs of the KCMSD’s growing poor, black population.  Because of 
white flight, a declining tax base, and rising costs of public services, Kansas City had grown 
increasingly dependent on federal funding to operate its schools.29  According to Peter Moran, 
federal funds never constituted more than 2% of the KCMSD’s operating budget until 1966.30
Two years later, the district received $4.2 million from Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA) grants, or nearly 10% of the KCMSD’s operating budget.31
D.  Pre-Jenkins Attempts to Desegregate
After the Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Education32 that de jure segregation 
of public schools was unconstitutional, the KCMSD school board ordered the superintendent and 
29
 Peter W. Moran, Too Little, Too Late: The Illusive Goal of School Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, and 
the Role of the Federal Government, 107 TCHRS. C. REC. 1933, 1940 (2005).  
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1941.  
32
 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
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the district’s research department to design a desegregation plan for the KCMSD.33  The 
transitional plan consisted of black and white attendance zones in which black and white students 
attended the school closest to them.  The plan also contained a transfer policy that enabled 
students to transfer between schools.34
The transitional plan failed to desegregate the KCMSD.35  One reason for the failure of 
the plan was that the KCMSD liberally granted student transfers.36  The transfer policy became 
the primary means by which students avoided desegregation.37  Another reason for this failure 
was that the attendance zones drawn by the school district tended to reflect the prevailing 
patterns of residential segregation.38  Although it became clear by the mid-1960s that the 
transitional plan was failing to bring about desegregation, the KCMSD refused to modify the 
transfer policy or implement strategies designed to bring about desegregation, such as clustering 
schools, implementing busing, creating magnet schools, or building schools on sites designed to 
maximize integration.39 Consequently, by the mid-1970s, Kansas City was no longer in 
compliance with constitutional standards of desegregation.40
The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) managed to convince the 
KCMSD to make changes in its desegregation plan through a “carrot and stick” approach.41  In 
exchange for federal resources, in the 1970s the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the HEW 
convinced the KCSMD to make several changes to its schools to achieve more desegregation.  
Among other things, the KCMSD changed its transfer policy from a vehicle for evading 
33 Moran, supra note 29, at 1935.  
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1937.  
36 Id. at 1935.  
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1936.  
39 Id. at 1936-40.  
40 Id. at 1940. 
41 Id.
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integration to a tool that could promote integration.42  The KCMSD also abandoned its 
neighborhood policy, while incorporating a desegregation plan that included school clusters and 
busing.43  Finally, through negotiations with OCR, the KCMSD implemented a magnet school 
program to attract white students.44
Unfortunately, HEW and OCR became involved too late to achieve desegregation in the 
KCMSD.  In 1960, there were more than 51,000 white students in the KCMSD, constituting 72% 
of the district’s enrollment.45  By the mid-1970s, when the HEW and OCR began to pressure the 
district to increase its efforts to obtain desegregation, there were fewer than 20,000 white 
students in the KCMSD, or one-third of the school population.46  Thus, it became apparent that 
only a desegregation plan that included the surrounding suburbs would desegregate the 
KCMSD.47
E.  Calls for Consolidation
Beginning in the mid-1960s, policy makers discussed the possibility of incorporating 
parts of the surrounding suburbs into the KCMSD.48  In 1967, KCMSD Superintendent James 
Hazlett suggested that a metropolitan approach to education and integration should be 
contemplated.  Suburban school administrators rejected Hazlett’s overtures.49  In 1968, a 
commission appointed by the state legislature recommended that the school districts of the 
Kansas City area be consolidated.50  According to the commission, the primary problem with 
42 Id. at 1949.  
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1950.  
46 Id.
47 Id.




Missouri’s organizational system was that taxable wealth and educational needs were unevenly 
distributed throughout the state.51 Students in metropolitan areas were harmed because of the 
high concentrations of disadvantaged persons in the cities.52
In 1969, the commission issued a report that set out a strategy for consolidating the 
KCMSD and St. Louis with the surrounding suburbs.53  Its plan called for a “regional board of 
education with limited responsibilities and local boards of education to perform most of the 
traditional functions of a school board.”54  The regional board would have the responsibility for 
levying a uniform education tax throughout the region and distributing such money to the local 
boards.55  The commission also proposed an organizational scheme that clustered urban and 
suburban school districts.56  The state legislature refused to adopt the suggestions of the 
commission because many rural committees were committed to resist further attempts to 
consolidate,57 and suburbanites objected to attempts to consolidate their schools with urban 
schools on local control grounds.58
51 Id. at 160-61.  
52 Id. at 161.  
53 HOOKER & MUELLER, supra note 12.  
54 Id. at 49.  
55 Id.
56 Id. at 51.  
57 MORAN, supra note 48, at 162.  In 1913, there were more than 10,000 districts in Missouri; more than 1,000 were 
rural school districts with less than 10 students.  KIRKENDALL, supra note 6, at 100.  In 1947, the state legislature 
passed a school reorganization law that radically reduced the number of school districts within the state.  The law 
required each board in 1949 to propose a reorganization plan for the school districts in the county.  The law also 
required the board to repeat the process if voters rejected the first plan.  To encourage consolidation, the state also 
provided funds for new construction.  By 1954, the state’s number of school districts had been reduced from nearly 
8,500 before the passage of the law to around 4,000.  Id. at 328.  There are presently 524 school districts in 
Missouri.  Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, Missouri School Improvement Program, 
at http://dese.mo.gov/divimprove/sia/msip/msip%20overview.htm (visited Mar. 11, 2006).  
58 MORAN, supra note 48, at 162.  
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SECTION II: MISSOURI V. JENKINS
In the previous section, we outlined the conditions in the KCMSD that led to the Jenkins
and Committee for Educational Equality cases and examined whether these cases addressed the 
school district’s needs.  Our review of the educational history of the KCMSD up until the 
commencement of the Jenkins litigation shows that district organizational policies worked 
together with the school finance system to create a situation in which the KCMSD may not have 
adequate resources to meet the needs of its student body.  School desegregation efforts before the 
Jenkins litigation neither increased resources for the KCMSD nor resulted in an alteration of 
school district boundaries.  Moreover, state officials ignored suggestions to consolidate the 
Kansas City metropolitan with the surrounding suburbs.   In this section we analyze whether 
Jenkins addressed these organization and funding problems.
A. 1977-1984
In March 1977, the KCMSD, the superintendent, members of the school board, and the 
children of school board members brought suit against the state governments of Kansas and 
Missouri, 18 school districts on both sides of the state line, and the federal departments of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the 
Department of Transportation (DOT).59  The plaintiffs alleged that de jure segregation in both 
Kansas and Missouri had helped to create the concentration of black residents in the KCMSD.60
In October 1978, Western District Court of Missouri Judge Russell Clark dismissed all of the 
Kansas defendants and realigned the KCMSD as a defendant.61
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 164.  
61 Id. at 169-70.  
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In 1979, a new plaintiff group consisting of eight school age children from the Kansas 
City area, represented by attorney Arthur Benson, filed an amended complaint alleging that the 
Kansas City public schools were unconstitutionally segregated.62  The state of Missouri, 13 
suburban school districts surrounding the KCMSD, the KCMSD, and the federal departments of 
HEW, HUD, and DOT were named as defendants.  The KCMSD then brought a cross-claim 
against the state on the ground that it had failed to dismantle its previous dual system.63
In 1984, Judge Clark dismissed the suburban school districts and federal agencies, but 
held that the KCMSD and the state had operated a de jure segregated school district.64  Clark 
also declared that “much of the cost for preparing and implementing a plan to dismantle the 
vestiges of a dual system in the KCMSD should be borne by the state” because the state had the 
“primary responsibility for insuring that the public education systems in the State comport with 
the United States Constitution.”65
Plaintiffs’ attorney Arthur Benson originally hoped to bring about a restructuring of the 
Kansas City-metropolitan area through the opening left in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I)66
permitting interdistrict remedies where plaintiffs could establish racially discriminatory intent on 
the part of suburban districts.67  When Clark ruled that the state had committed de jure
segregation in his 1984 opinion, Benson assumed that the verdict implied a finding of 
metropolitan-wide discrimination.68  Benson then drafted a plan that would have consolidated the 
KCMSD with the surrounding 11 suburban school districts.  Judge Clark struck down this plan 
62 Id. at 175.  
63
 593 F. Supp. 1485.  
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1506.  
66
 418 U.S. 717 (1974).  
67 An Ordinary Case with an Extraordinary Remedy, Miller Center for Public Affairs, University of Virginia, at
http://64.233.179.104/u/MCPA?q=cache:rxCFX6zaCZcJ:millercenter.virginia.edu/programs/apd/past_fellows/2000/
dunn_chapter.pdf+%22missouri+v.+jenkins%22&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1&ie=UTF-8 (visited Feb. 6, 2006).  
68 Id.
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because he lacked the authority under Milliken I to order the restructuring of school districts 
where no constitutional violation had occurred.69  As the judge explained, “because of 
restrictions on this Court’s remedial powers in restructuring the operations of local and state 
government entities, that portion of the KCMSD plan which would require the consolidation of 
eleven suburban school districts with the KCMSD goes far beyond the nature and extent of the 
constitutional violation this Court found existed.”70
B.  District Court Remedial Orders (1985-88)
In June 1985, Judge Clark issued his first remedial order.71  He found that “[s]egregation 
has caused a system wide reduction in student achievement in the schools of the KCMSD.”72
Judge Clark then ordered a variety of remedial programs, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 1977 
Milliken v. Bradley decision (Milliken II), which authorized federal district courts to impose 
remedial programs designed to remedies caused by racial discrimination.73  He then ordered a 
wide range of educational programming designed to increase student achievement.  Among other 
things, Clark held that the KCMSD be restored to AAA status, which was the highest level of 
accreditation granted by the state department of education.74  Clark also ordered that class sizes 
be reduced to “remedy the vestiges of past discrimination, by increasing individual attention and 
instruction, as well as increasing the potential for desegregation educational experiences for 
KCMSD students by maintaining and attracting non-minority enrollment.”75  Clark further 
ordered the adoption of summer school, full-day kindergarten, before and after school tutoring, 
69
 Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 698 (8th Cir. 1986) (summarizing district court’s January 1985 order).  
70 Id.
71
 Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D.Mo. 1985).  
72 Id. at 24 (emphasis supplied by the court).  
73
 433 U.S. 267 (1977).  
74 Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 26.  
75 Id. at 29. 
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and early childhood development programs.76  Moreover, Clark directed the state to fund an 
effective schools program for all of the schools within the KCMSD and the adoption of an 
extensive capital improvements program.77
Although Clark acknowledged that his 1984 opinion had declared that the state had the 
primary responsibility for bearing the costs for implementing the desegregation plan, he 
observed that the KCMSD should also bear some of the financial burden.78 The KCMSD’s 
operating levy at the time of the June 1985 order was $3.75 per $100 assessed valuation.  
However, a rollback statute called for the districts’ operating levy to be reduced to $3.26, and a 
statewide reassessment would further reduce the $3.26 levy.  Consequently, the KCMSD was $3 
million short of the revenue to pay for the levy and the district’s only unallocated funds were an 
$850,000 to $1million contingency fund.79  Clark ordered that the rollback be enjoined for one 
year to enable the state to raise an addition $4 million and to provide the KCMSD the 
opportunity to submit a tax levy increase at the next regularly scheduled school election.80  In 
subsequent decisions, Clark would increase the district’s levy to $4.96.81
In 1987, Clark concluded that the KCMSD did not have sufficient resources to fund its 
share of the remedy.82  He imposed a 1.5% increase as surcharge on the state income tax on 
residents and nonresidents of the KCMSD, including business associations, partnerships, and 
corporations for work performed in the KCMSD.83  This surcharge would remain in effect until 
76 Id. at 30-33.  
77 Id. at 33-34, 39-41.  
78 Id. at 43.  
79 Id. at 44.  
80 Id. at 45.  
81
 Jenkins v. Missouri, 1992 WL 551568 (W.D.Mo. Jun. 25, 1992) (authorizing the KCMSD to maintain its property 
tax levy at a rate of $4.96 per $100 assessed valuation for the 1992-93 school year); Jenkins v. Missouri, 1993 WL 
546576 (W.D.Mo. Jun. 30, 1993) (authorizing the KCMSD to maintain its property tax levy at a rate of $4.96 per 
$100 assessed valuation for the 1993-94, 1994-95, and 1995-96 school years).  
82
 Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 411 (W.D.Mo. 1987).  
83 Id. at 412.  
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the bonds were retired on until other provisions were implemented that would ensure their 
requirement.84  Clark also ordered the KCMSD to increase its property tax levy from $2.05 to 
$4.00 per $100 assessed valuation through the 1991-92 school year.85  Further, he directed the 
KCMSD to issue capital improvement bonds totaling $150 million, which would be retired 
within 20 years of the date issued.86
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the scope of the capital improvement and the 
imposition of a property tax increase, but held that the income tax surcharge was 
unconstitutional.87  With regard to the property tax increase, the court expressed its belief that the 
district court decision was within the scope of its remedial power.88  The court also noted that 
state law could not hamper a court from remedying a constitutional violation.89  However, the 
Eighth Circuit cautioned Judge Clark to pay more deference “to the views of state and local 
officials and to the working of local tax collection procedures to the extent that they appear 
compatible with the goals to be achieved.”90  The appropriate method for determining the 
KCMSD’s funding obligation was for the district court to “authorize the school board to submit a
proposed levy to the collection authorities adequate to fund its budget, including its share of the 
cost of the desegregation programs ordered by the district court,” and to enjoin county and state 
officials that would reduce the levy below the amount set by the board.91
The Eighth Circuit declared the income tax surcharge unconstitutional because the 
district court exceeded its remedial authority.92  While Judge Clark was authorized to set aside 




 Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988).  
88 Id. at 1311.  
89 Id. at 1313.  
90 Id. at 1314.  
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1315.  
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restrictions imposed by state law that hindered it from dismantling a dual educational system, he 
was not empowered to restructure the tax system.93  Thus, the income tax surcharge exceeded the 
district court’s authority because the tax “restructure[d] the State’s scheme of scheme of school 
financing and create[d] an entirely new form of taxing authority.”94
C.  Supreme Court Decision (1990)
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the state’s certiorari petition.95  The Court held that the 
property tax increase imposed by the district court exceeded its authority in imposing the tax 
increase itself, and that the Eighth Circuit should have reversed the district court in this regard.96
The Court noted that “[i]n assuming for itself the fundamental and delicate power of taxation the 
district court not only intruded on local authority but circumvented it altogether.”97  Before 
taking on this task, Judge Clark should have determined whether less intrusive options were 
available.98  The Supreme Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that it had no choice but 
to impose the tax increase because the Eighth Circuit had presented a viable option.  That is, 
Clark could have authorized the KCMSD to impose property taxes at a rate sufficient to fund the 
remedy and could have enjoined the operation of state laws that would have prevented the school 
district from exercising such power.99
The Supreme Court dismissed the state’s claim that Article III and the Tenth Amendment 
barred the federal judiciary from directing a local governmental entity to levy taxes necessary to 
comply with the desegregation decree.  The Court found that the Tenth Amendment was not 
93 Id.
94 Id.  
95
 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).  
96 Id. at 52.  




implicated when a federal court was remedying a state violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
This was the case because the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to curtail state conduct that 
violated the Constitution.100  With respect to Article III, the Court observed that a court order 
ordering a local governmental body to levy its own taxes was within the scope of a federal 
court’s power.101
D.  Supreme Court Decision (1995)
The Supreme Court again ruled on the Kansas City desegregation litigation in 1995.  This 
challenged revolved around two components of the district court’s remedial order.  The first 
component required the state to finance salary increases for the KCMSD instructional and non-
instructional staff.  The state asserted that funding for salaries went beyond the district court’s 
remedial authority.102  The second component required the state to continue financing quality 
educational programs for the 1992-93 school year.  The state asserted that such funding was 
prohibited by Freeman v. Pitts103 because the state had achieved partial unitary status with 
respect to the state’s quality programming.104
Judge Clark rejected the state’s arguments.  He held that the salary increases were 
necessary to improve educational opportunities and to reduce racial isolation.105  He also held 
that to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination, it was necessary to improve the 
“desegregative attractiveness” of the KCMSD.106  Although Clark did not address the state’s 
claim that it no longer had to provide funding for quality education because it had achieved 
100 Id. at 55.  
101 Id.
102 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 80.  
103
 503 U.S. 467 (1992).  




unitary status with respect to this issue, he nonetheless ordered the state to continue providing 
funding for quality programs.107
The Eighth Circuit upheld the holding of the district court.108  It rejected the state’s claim 
that the salary increases were not directly related to a state constitutional violation.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court noted that the remedy was not only designed to compensate victims of 
the KCMSD’s discriminatory practices, but was also designed to reverse white flight by 
providing superior educational opportunities.109  The court also rejected the state’s assertion that 
it had achieved unitary status with respect to quality programming because the KCMSD was still 
below national norms at a number of grade levels.110
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s holding that the state must fund salary 
increases and quality education programs exceeded the court’s remedial authority and remanded 
the case back to the district court.111  The Court found that the district court’s decree violated the 
Milliken decisions because it “created a magnet district of the KCMSD in order to serve the 
interdistrict goal of attracting nonminority students from the [surrounding school districts] and 
redistributing them within the KCMSD.”112
The Court also ruled that Judge Clark’s order requiring the state to continue funding 
quality educational programming because student achievement levels was below national norms 
could not be sustained.113  The Court noted that the basic chore of the district court was to 
determine whether the reduction in achievement in minority students caused by the KCMSD’s 
107 Id. at 80-81.  
108
 Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993).  
109 Id. at 767.  
110 Id. at 761-62.  
111 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 94.  
112 Id. (emphasis supplied by the Court). 
113 Id. at 100.  
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prior de jure discrimination was eliminated to the extent practicable.114  However, Judge Clark 
had failed to determine the effect that segregation had on the performance of minority 
students.115  Moreover, the Court explained that many of the goals of quality education programs 
had been achieved.  Specifically, the Court explained that the KCMSD had achieved AAA 
accreditation status and that students who had attended schools that had not received such status 
had received remedial programming for up to seven years.116  Finally, the Court reminded Judge 
Clark to “bear in mind that its end purpose is not only ‘to remedy the violation’ to the extent 
practicable, but also ‘to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is 
operating in compliance with the Constitution.’ ”117
E.  Settlement Decree (1997-98)
Energized by its victory before the Supreme Court, the state moved in April 1996 for a 
declaration of unitary status.118  In May 1996, the state and the KCMSD entered into an 
agreement whereby the state would be dismissed from the case once it had paid $320 million in 
desegregation funds to the KCMSD over a three-year period, with the court’s approval.119  The 
termination agreement would have kept in place the court-ordered KCMSD tax levy, which had 
been raised to $4.96 per $100 in assessed value.120  In March 1997, Judge Clark approved the 
agreement, but refused to grant the KCMSD’s request to extend court supervision until 
alternative funding sources were guaranteed.  He held that the district court did not have the 
114 Id. at 101.  
115 Id.
116 Id. at 102.  
117 Id. (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S., at 489).  
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 Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1154 (W.D. Mo. 1997).  
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120 Id. at 1154.  
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power to impose the levy in order to avoid “fiscal chaos.”121  Judge Clark also rejected the 
argument that “financial vestige” was a remaining vestige of prior discrimination.122  Essentially, 
the KCMSD argued that the actions of the state created an atmosphere that made it impossible 
for the district to raise funds necessary to operate its schools.123  Clark rejected this argument 
because it was the duty of the KCMSD and the state to ensure that the district had adequate 
funding.124
During the transitional period, Clark ordered the KCMSD to reduce the achievement gap 
between black and white students by 2.6 normalized curve equivalents (NCE’s) because “13% of 
the initial gap and 13% of the increase in the gap may be traced to the prior discrimination within 
the KCMSD.”125  He also ordered the district to modify its budget process “so that actual 
expenditures may be reconciled with the budgeted amounts for each line item by department.”126
Clark found that the state had not achieved unitary status with regard to racial balance, but held 
that the state had achieved unitary status with respect to extracurricular activities.127
Judge Clark’s 1997 opinion is notable for his reflections regarding the successes and 
failures of the desegregation decree.  He observed that “the Court remains quite proud of the 
innovations it ordered,” and that “[a] large amount of the money spent in the District has indeed 
resulted in tangible benefits.”128  These benefits included “new and renovated schools, an 
increased number of computers, higher technology available to all students, and intervention 
121 Id. at 1162.  
122 Id. at 1169.  
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 1179.  
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1165-68.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed Judge Clark’s ruling on appeal.  Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588 
(8th Cir. 1997).  
128 Jenkins, 959 F. Supp. at 1173.  
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programs to help impoverished children.”129  Despite the strides made by the district during the 
Jenkins litigation, Clark acknowledged that the performance of the KCMSD was inadequate in 
many areas.130  Among other things, he cited the lack of a comprehensive instructional program, 
on-going administrative instability, the lack of a security plan, and the lack of a budgeting 
plan.131  He was also troubled by the fact that only five elementary schools, one middle school, 
and one high school achieved or surpassed the statewide average on the Missouri Mastery and 
Achievement Tests (MMAT).132
Judge Clark concluded that these deficiencies were not caused by a lack in educational 
resources.  In fact, he asserted that “the KCMSD has an operating budget that far exceeds the 
budgets of other school districts.”133  Clark was also troubled by the “size and inefficiencies of 
the KCMSD’s administration.”134  Because he was concerned that the KCMSD was not up to the 
task of getting its financial affairs in order during the transitional period,135 he appealed to the 
state educational commissioner and the state department of education to over the KCMSD 
through its transitional phase.136  If they declined his request, then Clark would seek the 
department’s help in finding a Special Master to manage the KCMSD.137
The KCMSD appealed Judge Clark’s holding that it was not the district court’s duty to 
guarantee funding for the district and that there was no financial vestige of prior 
discrimination.138  After the appeal was argued, Missouri voters adopted a constitutional 
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1173-74.  
132 Id. at 1173.
133 Id. at 1174 (emphasis supplied by the court).  We analyze whether the KCMSD was such a high-spending district 
in Section V. 
134 Id. at 1177.  We analyze whether the KCMSD was an inefficient system in Section V. 
135 Id. at 1178.  
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amendment that authorized school boards whose operating levy for 1995 was set by court order 
to set subsequent tax rates at any levy below the 1995 rate, which was $4.96 for the KCMSD.139
Additionally, the state legislature enacted Senate Bill 781 after argument on appeal, which set the 
operating levy for the KCMSD at $4.95.   This legislation was contingent upon settlement of the 
St. Louis case on or before March 15, 1999.140  The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal because 
it was now possible for the KCMSD to fund school construction projects.  Thus, the case was not 
ripe for review.141
F.  March to Unitary Status (1999-2003)
After the March 1997 order, Judge Clark excused himself from the Jenkins litigation.142
The case was then reassigned to Judge Dean Whipple.143  True to Clark’s predictions, many of 
the chronic problems facing the district endured.144  In October 1999, the state department of 
education unanimously voted to designate the KCSMD as unaccredited.145  State officials found 
that the district satisfied none of the 11 state performance standards for accreditation, including 
general academic achievement, reading achievement, scores on college entrance exams, 
attendance, and dropout rates.146  Judge Whipple found that the state department of education’s 
curriculum standards were consistent with the district court’s desegregation decree because they 
both encouraged the district to take steps to improve academic achievement.147  Whipple also 
found that the board’s decision to designate the KCMSD as unaccredited could help the district 
139 MO. CONST. art. X, § 11(g).  
140
 S. Bill 781, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998). 
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achieve the goals of the desegregation order by holding it accountable for its educational 
failures.148  Moreover, Whipple rejected the KCMSD’s assertion that the board’s removal of 
accreditation status would make it virtually impossible for the district to comply with its 
desegregation order.  “While the negative consequences of an unaccredited designation, both 
direct and indirect, may indeed be real,” Whipple observed that teachers and students may more 
likely leave the KCMSD because of the “realization that the KCMSD is not, in fact, providing he 
education needed.”149
Judge Whipple also held sua sponte that the KCMSD had achieved unitary status and 
dismissed pending litigation.150  Whipple acted in this manner because the district had made 
considerable progress toward eliminating the vestiges of prior segregation to the extent 
practicable and because the state’s accreditation standards would force the KCMSD to take the 
necessary steps to improve educational outcomes.151 Additionally, Whipple dismissed the suit 
because the KCMSD was providing an equal education to its students, regardless of race.152 On 
this point, Whipple cautioned that the U.S. Constitution does not set educational standards; thus, 
“it is incumbent on this Court to ensure that the Fourteenth Amendment not become so corrupted 
as to guarantee educational standards that it was not meant to ensure.”153  The Eighth Circuit 
reversed Whipple’s sua sponte ruling stating that the KCMSD had  attained unitary status and 
releasing the district from further court supervision because the parties were entitled to a notice 
and a hearing before the district court dismissed the case.154
148 Id. at 1077.  
149 Id.
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On March 2001, Judge Whipple held a unitary status hearing on the KCMSD’s motion 
for partial unitary status.155  On March 2002, Whipple held that the district had achieved unitary 
status with regard to racial balance, facilities, budget and transportation.156  On March 2003, 
Judge Whipple granted the KCMSD’s motion for unitary status because the district had reduced 
the achievement gap by the amount required by Judge Clark in his 1997 decision and because the 
district had in good faith complied with the district court’s orders for a reasonable time.157
SECTION III:  COMMITTEE FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY V. STATE
The Committee for Educational Equality case began in 1990, when plaintiffs filed a 
lawsuit alleging that the state’s school finance system violated the state constitution.158  The 
plaintiffs consisted of a non-profit group representing poor rural and urban school districts.  The 
St. Louis and Kansas City School districts joined the case as intervenor-plaintiffs and four 
affluent districts joined as intervenor-defendants.159  This section provides a summary of the trial 
court opinion, discusses the state legislature’s response (The Outstanding Schools Act), and 
provides a brief summary of key points from the Jenkins and Committee for Educational
Equality cases.
A.  Trial Court Opinion
In January 1993, a state trial court held that the school finance system violated the state 
equal protection clause because “the wealth of the local community is the primary and 
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predominant determinant of the quality of a child’s education in Missouri.”160  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court noted that “[a] high and very significant correlation exists among all school 
districts between state and local revenues per pupil and equalized assessed valuation of property 
per pupil.”161  The court found that an even higher correlation existed “between the statutorily 
determined measure of local fiscal capacity” and “state and local revenues per pupil.”162  These 
funding inequalities between rich and poor school districts could not be justified “by asserting 
that the poor have brought the plight upon themselves by putting forth low local fiscal effort to 
support the public schools” because the data clearly demonstrated that such disparities were 
caused by local wealth, rather than choice.163
Moreover, the court held that the school finance system violated the education clause 
because it failed to provide adequate funding to meet the educational needs of their students.164
The state’s failure to fund education existed in spite of the fact that the state had the capacity to 
fund education.  Missouri ranked 49th among states in terms of current expenditures for public 
schools as a percent of personal income.165  In fact, in order to raise current per-pupil 
expenditures to the national average in 1989-90 of $4,975, an additional $957 million in funding 
would be necessary.166
The court neither ordered the redistribution of educational funding nor instructed the state 
legislature as to how it could satisfy its constitutional duty.  The court stayed the judgment until 
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90 days after the next regular session to give the legislature the chance to enact a school finance 
system that was in compliance with the state constitution.167
B.  Outstanding Schools Act
In response to the trial court decision, the legislature in 1993 enacted the Outstanding 
Schools Act, which, among other things, increased matching aid levels, encouraged all districts 
to raise their property tax levies, and modestly altered other features of the school finance 
formula.168  Like its predecessor, the formula provided school districts with a guaranteed tax 
base, but raised the minimum local property tax rate without voter referendum from $1.25 to 
$2.75 for every $100 of assessed value.169  Matching aid ratios were determined by the ratio of 
each district’s taxable assessed property value per pupil compared to the state guaranteed 
assessed valuation per pupil, and included an income multiplier (district income factor) to drive 
more matching aid to lower income districts.170  If a district’s own assessed value per pupil is 
167 Id. at 33. The Missouri Supreme Court dismissed the defendants’ appeal because the trial court opinion was not a 
final, appealable judgment.  Committee for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446, 454 (Mo.banc 1994).  
168 MO. REV. STAT. § 160.500 -- 160.538, 160.545, 160.550, 161.099, 161.610, 162.203, 162.1010, 163.023, 
166.275, 166.300, 170.254, 173.750, 178.585, 178.698 (West 2005).  The act “includes provisions relating to 
reduced class size, the A+ schools program, funding for parents as teachers and early childhood development, 
teacher training, the upgrading of vocational and technical education, measures to promote accountability and other 
provisions of those sections.”  Id. § 160.500(1). 
The trial court held that the Outstanding School Act rendered all of the original claims made in Committee for 
Educational Equality moot, except for a state constitutional provision requiring that at least 25% of state revenues 
be applied to education.  Committee for Educ. Equal. v. State, 967 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Mo. banc 1998).  On that matter, 
the trial court held that the state had allocated more than the mandated minimum amount and found for the 
defendants.  On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that funds received from the federal government should be considered 
state revenue pursuant to the 25% funding provision of the state constitution.  Id.  The state supreme court rejected 
this assertion, noting that “[i]t is no longer the case, if indeed, it ever was, that ‘state revenue’ merely means all 
monies deposited in the state treasury.”  Id. at 64. 
169 MO. REV. STAT. § 163.031(1).  In 1980, Missouri voters adopted an amendment to the state constitution, known 
as the “Hancock Amendment,” which required voter approval of any increase above the local property tax rate in 
effect when the provision was adopted on November 1980.  MO. CONST. art. X, § 22(a).  In 1998, the state 
constitution was amended to permit school boards to set their property tax rates at $2.75 or less without voter 
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approximately 50% of the state guarantee, that district would receive in state aid, $1 for each 
dollar raised from local property income.  School districts also received additional funding for 
several categories, including special education students and students eligible for free and reduced 
lunch.171
This would mean that in a year where the state guaranteed wealth was $150,000, the 
minimum attainable state and local revenue per pupil without voter referendum would be $4,125.  
For a district with 50% of the guaranteed wealth, $2,062 would be raised from local taxes and 
$2,062 would be provided in state aid.  If that district had 20% children qualifying for free and 
reduced lunch, the district would be guaranteed a minimum of approximately $4,290 per child.  
If that same district had lower than average income, state aid per pupil would be adjusted slightly 
upward.  In short, increased numbers of children in poverty and lower income levels increase the 
matching rate of state aid.172
At the time of the passage of the Outstanding Schools Act, the KCMSD did not operate 
under the $2.75 minimum, but was instead operating under the $4.96 levy imposed by Judge 
Clark.173  The KCMSD continued to operate under the court-imposed levy after the passage of 
the act, meaning that the act did little to change the financial circumstances of KCMSD.174  As 
noted earlier, the state legislature adopted Senate Bill 781, which set tax rate for the KCMSD at 
$4.95.  That is, the state chose to meet its state constitutional obligation by allowing local boards 
171 Id. § 163.031(3).  
172
 Nonetheless, R. Craig Wood and Associates, in a 2003 Report to Missouri Legislators, found that funding levels 
remained highly associated with district property wealth and income and almost entirely associated with local 
property tax rates.  R. CRAIG WOOD ET AL., FINANCING MISSOURI’S PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
SCHOOLS: FINAL REPORT (2003). 
173
 Jenkins v. Missouri, 1992 WL 551568 (W.D.Mo. Jun. 25, 1992) (authorizing the KCMSD to maintain its 
property tax levy at a rate of $4.96 per $100 assessed valuation for the 1992-93 school year).  
174
 Jenkins v. Missouri, 1993 WL 546576 (W.D.Mo. Jun. 30, 1993) (authorizing the KCMSD to maintain its 
property tax levy at a rate of $4.96 per $100 assessed valuation for the 1993-94, 1994-95, and 1995-96 school 
years).  
32
of education to access a $2.75 tax rate to generate “adequate” funding, but required that KCMSD 
levy a $4.95 tax rate to generate “adequate” funding. 
In 2005 the Missouri legislature adopted a more complete overhaul of the school finance 
formula, which will ultimately guarantee a foundation level of funding at $6,117 per pupil (on a 
7-year phase-in), and include increased student need weights for children in poverty and limited 
English proficient children.  The plan is to be partially supported by increasing local tax levies to 
$3.43, from $2.75. Still, KCMSD is assumed to generate its higher “adequate” level of financing 
with a $4.95 rate.175
The legislature’s decision to continue to codify KCMSD’s court-imposed tax levy for its 
school finance formula directly contradicts the approach that many states take with regard to 
high-need school districts.  By the late 1980s and early 1990s, many states had already moved 
away from tax rate driven, matching aid formulas.  Such formulas typically set a base level of 
funding and apply a series of need weightings to specific student populations to generate for each 
district, a need adjusted basic level of funding.  Then, each district levies a state required tax rate, 
and the state fills the gap between the funds raised locally from the required property tax rate and 
the need adjusted basic level of funding.176  Under such a model, had the KCMSD’s need been 
estimated at 40 to 50% above the basic level, it would have been the state’s obligation to fill this 
gap. While SB 287 adopts such a structure, actual student need adjustments in the formula are 
insufficient for driving adequate funds to KCMSD, St. Louis City or other poor urban fringe 
175 Id. § 163.011.  The Committee for Educational Equality has challenged the new school finance formula on the 
ground that it exacerbates the constitutional deficiencies of the school finance system.  Missouri School Boards' 
Association, School Districts File Updated Lawsuit Challenging State Funding (11/28/2005), News and Events, at
http://www.msbanet.org/news/news.asp?ID=281 (visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
176
 Bruce D. Baker & William D. Duncombe, Balancing District Needs and Student Needs: The Roleof Economies of 
Scale Adjustments and Pupil Need Weights in School Finance Formulas, 29 J. OF EDUC. FIN. 97 (2004).  
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districts. As such, funding generated in these districts at only the $3.43 levy will be insufficient.
These inadequacies will be only partially offset by KCMSD’s mandated higher rate.
C.  Summary of Jenkins and Committee for Educational Equality
Our analysis of the Jenkins litigation reveals that Judge Clark attempted to enforce 
remedies on the KCMSD and the state of Missouri within his power under federal court 
precedents – most notably Milliken I and Milliken II.  He refused to redraw district boundaries.  
Instead, he imposed a high property tax on the KCMSD that would, under the state’s existing 
school finance formula, generate sufficient state and local revenues.  Also, the state legislature 
responded to the KCMSD’s concerns about funding after it had achieved unitary status by 
continuing to impose local property taxes at the level set by Judge Clark.  
The state legislature responded to the Committee for Educational Equality litigation by 
accepting the state court’s decree that educational equity and adequacy across schools in the state 
were primarily state legislative responsibilities, except in the case of the KCMSD, where the 
legislature left in place the higher taxes that it had imposed to settle the Jenkins case.  As we 
have observed, the state legislature’s requirement that the KCMSD assume such a high tax 
burden for funding an adequate education directly contradicted the funding approach that a 
number of states have adopted with respect to their high-need districts.  
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SECTION IV: IMPLICATIONS OF THE KCMSD SAGA FOR SCHOOL FINANCE 
LITIGATION
A number of conservatives have used the KCMSD experience as proof that no correlation 
exists between funding and educational outcomes.177  In this section, we provide an overview of 
school finance litigation and discuss how several courts have accepted the premise that such a 
correlation exists.  
A.  Overview of School Finance Litigation
Scholars have divided school finance litigation into three “waves” in which one legal 
approach has predominated.178  During the first wave, which lasted from the late 1960s to 1973, 
plaintiffs claimed that funding disparities between rich and poor school districts violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.  In 1973, the Supreme Court ended the first wave in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez by holding that Texas’ reliance on local property 
taxation was permissible under the Equal Protection Clause.179  The Court ruled that strict 
scrutiny was inapplicable because wealth was not a suspect classification180 and education was 
not a fundamental right.181 Applying rational basis analysis, the Court held that the use of local 
property taxation was rationally related to the goal of encouraging local control of the public 
schools.182
177 See note 5 for citations.  
178 See Kent K. Anker, Differences and Dialogue: School Finance in New York State, 24 N.Y. U. REV. OF L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 345; Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 
101 (1995); Preston C. Green, III & Bruce D. Baker, Circumventing Rodriguez: Can Plaintiffs Use the Equal 
Protection Clause to Challenge School Finance Disparities Caused by Inequitable State Distribution Policies?, 7 
TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 141 (2002); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third 
Wave," 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1995).  
179
 411 U.S. 1 (1973).  
180 Id. at 29.  
181 Id. at 37.  
182 Id. at 49-50.  
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In the second wave of school finance litigation, which lasted from 1973 to 1989, 
plaintiffs asserted that funding disparities between rich and poor school districts violated state 
equal protection and education clauses.  This approach had limited success: six state supreme 
courts invalidated their school finance formulas,183 while 13 declared their formulas 
constitutional.184  A major reason for this limited success was the local control doctrine.  During 
the second wave, ten state supreme courts used the rational basis test to analyze state 
constitutional challenges to local property taxation.  Nine of these courts held that local taxation 
was rationally related to the purpose of maintaining local control.185
In the current wave, which began in 1989, plaintiffs have primarily asserted that school 
finance systems are preventing states from providing poor school districts with an adequate 
education as defined by state education clauses.  The seminal third wave case is Rose v. Council 
for Better Education, Inc., a case in which the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated the state’s 
entire educational system failed to provide students with an adequate education as required by its 
education clause.186 In many successful third wave adequacy cases, courts have adopted 
183
 These states are as follows: (1) Arkansas, DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford County, 651 S.W.2d 90 
(Ark. 1983); (2) California, Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (1976); (3) Connecticut, Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 
359 (Conn. 1977); (4) New Jersey, Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); (5) Washington, Seattle School 
Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); and (6) Wyoming, Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. 
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).  It is important to note that the Robinson and Seattle School District No. 1
cases were decided on adequacy instead of equity grounds.
184
 These states are as follows: (1) Arizona, Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); (2) Colorado, Lujan v. 
Colo. St. Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982);  (3) Georgia, McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1982); 
(4) Idaho, Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); (5) Maryland, Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of 
Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); (6) Michigan, Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); (7) New York, 
Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); (8) Ohio, Board of Educ. 
of City School Dist. of City of Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); (9) Oregon, Olsen v. State, 554 
P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); (10) Oklahoma, Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1987); 
(11) Pennsylvania, Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); (12) South Carolina, Richland County v. Campbell, 
364 S.E.2d 470  (S.C. 1988); (13) Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).  
185 (1) Shoftstall, 515 P.2d 390; (2) Lujan, 649 P.2d 1005; (3) McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d 156, (4) Thompson, 537 P.2d 
635; (5) Hornbeck, 458 A.2d 758; (6) Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., 439 N.E.2d 359; (7) Board 
of Educ. of the City of Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813; (8) Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135; (9) 
Kukor, 436 N.W.2d 568.  The only second wave case to rule that reliance on local property taxation violated the 
rational basis test was Dupree, 651 S.W.2d 90. 
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 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
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outcomes-based definitions of an adequate education and then directed state legislature to 
develop remedies that will attain these mandates.187  Several courts have also found during the 
third wave that a correlation exists between educational spending and academic performance.  In 
Rose, for instance, the Kentucky Supreme Court observed that “achievement test scores in the 
poorer districts are lower than those of rich districts and expert testimony clearly established that 
there is a correlation between those scores and the wealth of the district.”188  The court also noted 
that “Kentucky’s overall effort and resulting achievement in the area of primary and secondary 
education are comparatively low, nationally, is not in dispute”189
In Lake View School District No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, the state of 
Arkansas disputed a claim that it was not providing students with an adequate education by 
arguing that no correlation existed between increased educational funding and improved school 
performance.190 The state asserted that it had increased educational spending in response to the 
state supreme court’s holding that the school finance system was unconstitutional in DuPree v. 
Alma School District No. 30 of Crawford County191 and that student performance had not 
significantly improved. The state supreme court rejected this claim, in part, because the state’s 
187
 In Rose, for instance, stated that the legislature must develop an educational system that provided children with 
the following capacities:
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and 
rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social and political systems 
to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental 
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state and 
nation; (iv) sufficient self knowledge and knowledge of his or her physical wellness; (v) sufficient 
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; 
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields 
so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of 
academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with 
counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.  Id. at 212.  
The supreme courts of Arkansas (Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 144 S.W.3d 741 (Ark. 2004)); 
Massachusetts (McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993)); and New 
Hampshire (Claremont v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997)) have adopted Rose’s definition of outcomes-based 
adequacy. 
188 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197.  
189 Id. (emphasis supplied).  
190
 91 S.W.3d 472, 488 (Ark. 2002).  
191
 651 S.W.2d 90.  
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efforts to “correct the course of educational deficiencies in Arkansas are dependent on quality 
teachers.”192 The state had failed to ensure that its poor school districts would have quality 
teachers. The state’s entry level for teacher salaries was the lowest of the nine states comprising 
its region and was ranked 48th nationally.193  There were also serious disparities in teacher 
salaries in Arkansas and poor school districts were losing teachers because of low pay.194
In Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State,195 the New York Court of Appeals found that a 
correlation existed between the school finance system and the poor performance of New York 
City students.  Increased funding could improve student performance by enabling New York 
City schools to provide better teachers, facilities, and instrumentalities of learning.196
B.  The KCMSD Desegregation Plan as Proof That “Money Doesn’t Matter”
The conservative claim that the KCMSD proves that no correlation exists between 
increased funding and educational outcomes rests on three premises.  The first premise is that the 
KCMSD received more money for education than the rest of the country for an extended period .  
For instance, a 1998 report from the Cato Institute claims that the KCMSD “spent as much as 
$11,700 per-pupil – more money per pupil, on a cost of living adjusted basis, than any other of 
the 280 largest districts in the country,” and that “it got it for more than a decade.”197
192 Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 91 S.W.3d at 489.  
193 Id. at 488-89.  
194 Id. at 489.  
195
 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003).  
196 Id. at 340-41.  By contrast, in  Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District, 176 
S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005), a case holding that the state of Texas had provided students with an adequately funded 
education, the Supreme Court of Texas rejected the assertion that increased funding would lead to improved 
educational outcomes.  As the court explained: “While the end-product of public education is related to the 
resources available for its use, the relationship is neither simple nor direct; public education can and often does 
improve with greater resources, just as it struggles when resources are withheld, but more money does not guarantee 
better schools or more educated students.”  Id. at 788 (emphasis supplied). 
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 Paul Ciotti, Money and School Performance: Lessons from the Kansas City Desegregation Experiment, Policy 
Analysis No. 298 (March 16, 1998), at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-298.pdf (visited Dec. 2, 2005).  
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The second premise is that the state of Missouri picked up the majority of the tab for the 
desegregation plan, which caused much harm to other school districts.  For example, a 1993 
article in The Economist asserted that “[m]ore than three-quarters of the cost” of the 
desegregation plan “was borne by the state rather than the school district.”198  According to the 
1998 Cato Institute report, state attorney general Jay Nixon claimed that “44 percent of the entire 
state budget for elementary and secondary education was going to just 9 percent of the state’s 
students who lived in Kansas City and St. Louis.”199  To replace the money spent on St. Louis 
and the KCMSD, “other districts in the state had to cancel field trips and extracurricular 
activities, defer maintenance, fire teachers, and freeze salaries.”200
The third premise is that because the added resources did not lead to improved student 
outcomes, the KCMSD desegregation plan is the national model for why pouring exorbitant 
sums of tax dollars into poor, urban, black schools is simply non-productive and inefficient.  
For example, David Armor and Christine Rossell noted that “[w]ith a unique court-ordered tax 
levy and court-ordered funding from the state, total expenditures [in the KCMSD] reached 
$10,000 per pupil by 1990, with total funding exceeding $1.5 million over approximately an 
eight-year period.”201  However, this increase in expenditures did not raise the achievement 
levels of black students, which remained significantly below the achievement levels of white 
students from 1988 to 1995.  “Thus,” Rossell and Armor concluded, “spending an 
extraordinary amount of money on a school desegregation plan and on magnet schools does 
not seem to improve minority achievement significantly or decrease the minority-white 
198 The Cash Street Kids, supra note 5.  
199
 Ciotti, supra note 199, at 10.  
200 Id.
201
 David J. Armor & Christine H. Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in the Public Schools, in BEYOND THE 
COLOR LINE 219, 247-48 (2002).  
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achievement gap.”202 Critics also cite the KCMSD’s loss of accreditation in 2000 for failure to 
meet the 11 state performance standards for accreditation as further evidence that the 
desegregation plan was an abject failure.203
In the wake of a New York trial court ruling in Campaign for Fiscal Equity that the 
state’s school finance system was providing New York City school children with an adequate 
education,204 noted educational economist Eric Hanushek warned that Jenkins demonstrated 
that putting more money into the New York City was unlikely to lead to improved student 
performance.  Hanushek asserted: 
One need only look at the results in Kansas City.  A school desegregation ruling 
in the 1980s began a period of more than a decade when the schools had access to 
virtually unlimited state funds.  The dreams of school personnel did not translate 
into any measurable gains in student performance, even as their schools moved to 
the very top of national spending.205
SECTION V:  EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE CONSERVATIVE CRITIQUE
As we have explained, the conservative claim that the KCMSD desegregation plan 
clearly establishes that there is no correlation between educational outcomes and student 
achievement rests on three premises: (1) the KCMSD received more money than other school 
districts over an extended period ; (2) the state of Missouri covered a disproportionate share of 
the costs of the desegregation plan, to the detriment of school districts throughout the rest of the 
state; and (3) the exorbitant spending on KCMSD was largely inefficient, leading to no 
202 Id. at 248.  
203 See David W. Kirkpatrick, For Schools Money Isn't the Answer, U.S. Freedom Foundation, at
http://www.freedomfoundation.us/for_schools_money_isn_t_the_answer (visited Nov. 29, 2005).  
204
 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001), rev'd, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2002), aff'd and rem'd, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003).  
205
 Eric A. Hanushek, Have New York City Children Been Saved?, Hoover Institution, at http://www-
hoover.stanford.edu/pubaffairs/we/2002/hanushek_0302.html (last modified Mar. 25, 2002).  
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performance outcome improvement.  In this section, we empirically analyze each of these 
claims. 
A. Premise #1: Did the KCMSD Receive More Money Than Other School Districts Over an 
Extended Period?
We first address the question of precisely how much KCMSD did spend per pupil and for 
how long, with a number of relative comparisons: 
1. Relative to public school districts located in large urban centers nationally, how did the 
Kansas City Missouri school districts’ actual current operating expenditures and current 
instructional expenditures compare? 
2. Relative to other public school districts in the same labor market for teachers and 
marketplace for homeowners as defined by Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(CMSA), how much more per pupil did the Kansas City Missouri public schools spend 
from 1980 to 2003, with specific annual analysis from 1990 to 2000?  
3. Relative to other public school districts in the Kansas City CMSA, how did the 
demographics of Kansas City Missouri public schools differ and how did those 
demographics change from 1990 to 2000? 
Table 2 summarizes the current operating per-pupil and instructional expenditures of the 
KCMSD relative to other major metropolitan districts nationally throughout the 1990s.  Data for 
years 1990 to 2000 are from the National Center for Education Statistics, Fiscal-Non-fiscal 
longitudinal file.  Data underlying Table 2 include only those districts in NCES Locale code “1,” 
for districts in large central cities.  Only districts enrolling at least 20,000 students were included.  
No regional cost or student need-based adjustments are applied. The data set includes 51 to 77 
districts per year. 
On average, throughout the 1990s, the KCMSD was a high spending district, spending 
from 12% to 76% above other major metropolitan districts in current operating expenditures per 
pupil but only from 2% to 38% above other major metropolitan districts in instructional 
41
expenditures per pupil, a portion of the difference between current operating and instructional 
spending being current expenditures to pay-off costs associated with capital projects tied to the 
desegregative attractiveness plan.  Also, the KCMSD’s operational and instructional edge 
declined rapidly from 1995 to 2000 following the U.S. Supreme Court decision to halt district 
court remedies.   It would thus appear from Table 2 that KCMSD’s operating funding peaked for 
a window of about three to five years, and not the ten year period often referenced.  Moreover, 
Table 2 includes data from 1968 and 1980 from a national survey of school finance (Elementary 
and Secondary General Information Survey).  These figures show that in 1980 and as far back as 
1968, KCMSD well prior to Jenkins, KCMSD was already spending significantly more than 
large urban districts elsewhere in the nation.  In fact, in 1968 and 1980, the KCMSD’s ratio of 
spending to average spending for the group was much higher than in 2000. 
Table 2
Comparisons of Kansas City, Missouri and Major Metropolitan Districts
Year Current 
Expenditure Ratio to 
Other Large Cities
Instructional 
Expenditure Ratio to 
Other Large Cities
Poverty Ratio
to Other Large 
Cities
Black Ratio to 
Other Large 
Cities




1990 1.39                  1.13            0.91            1.81 51
1991 1.56                  1.29            0.94            1.82 51
1992 1.73                  1.36            0.95            1.88 52
1993 1.50                  1.16            0.91            1.84 51
1994 1.57                  1.24            1.00            1.89 53
1995 1.76                  1.38            1.42           2.15 78
1996 1.55                  1.31            1.08            2.16 77
1997 1.37                  1.18            1.23            2.18 77
1998 1.30                  1.12            1.20            2.17 77
1999 1.14     1.02            1.26            2.13 69
2000 1.12                  1.02            1.25            1.98 73
Districts in NCES Locale #1 with over 20,000 students in ADM
Primary Data Source: National Center for Education Statistics Fiscal Longitudinal File
[a] Elementary and Secondary Education General Information Survey, 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/IAED-SERIES/00101.xml
[b] Elementary and Secondary Education General Information Survey, 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/IAED-SERIES/00101.xml
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Table 3 attempts more directly to address the question of whether the KCMSD outspent 
for a decade or more, all other major metropolitan districts, adjusting for regional cost variations, 
using the 1993 – 94 National Center for Education Statistics Geographic Cost of Education 
Index.206  Data from 1990 to 2000 are drawn from the same source used in Table 2.  Data from 
1968 and 1980 are drawn from an archived data set of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
General Information Survey,207 predecessor to the U.S. Census Bureau’s Fiscal Survey of Local 
Governments (F-33), Public Elementary and Secondary School Finances.  In 1968, the KCMSD 
ranked 19th of 142 districts enrolling 30,000 or more pupils.  In 1980, five years before the 
initial district court decision and remedy order, the KCMSD ranked 24th nationally in unadjusted 
dollars. 
Table 3 shows that in either adjusted or unadjusted dollars, the KCMSD ranked first 
nationally for only one year, 1992.  In most years, the KCMSD fell behind districts including 
Boston, Rochester (NY), Pittsburg, Portland (OR) or Newark (NJ).  By 2000, the KCMSD had 
fallen to 19th of 73 districts, lower than it had been in 1968 at 19th of 142. 
Table 3
National Ranking of Kansas City in Adjusted and Unadjusted Per Pupil Expenditures
Year Number of
Districts in Group
Kansas City Rank 
(Current Expenditures)





1990 51[c] 7 4
1991 51 4 2
1992 52 1 1
1993 51 7 3
1997 77 6 4
2000 73 19 17
[a] All districts with greater than 30,000 students
[b] All metropolitan districts with greater than 20,000 students
[c] Large central city metropolitan districts with greater than 20,000 students
[d] National Center for Education Statistics Geographic Cost of Education Index (1993)
206
 National Center for Education Statistics, Education Finance Statistics Center, at
http://www.nces.ed.gov/edfin/prodsurv/data.asp (visited Mar. 13, 2006).  
207
 International Archive of Education Data, Elementary & Secondary Education General Information Survey 
(ELSEGIS) Series, at http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/IAED-SERIES/00101.xml (visited Mar. 13, 2006).  
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Indeed Kansas City has historically been a high spending metropolitan school district.  However, 
we find little or no evidence that the KCMSD spent more than all other major metropolitan 
districts and did so for as many if not more than 10 years running. 
Next, we compare current operating and current instructional expenditures of the 
KCMSD to other districts in the Kansas City Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA).  Table 4 again 
uses NCES/Census (F-33) data coupled with earlier ELSEGIS data. Table 4 shows that the 
KCMSD spent in some years, as much as twice what other districts in the same metropolitan area 
were spending. Focusing on instruction alone, that margin is cut to 58% above other Kansas 
City metro area districts.  As seen in comparisons with national metropolitan areas, from 1995 to 
2000, the KCMSD’s funding margin tapered off quickly, to only 23% above metro average in 
current expenditures and only 9% above metro average in instructional expenditures.  Coupled 
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1980                  1.34 
1990                  1.77                  1.32            2.91            6.73            2.33            1.08            0.84 
1991                  2.03                  1.58            2.74            6.76            2.12            1.07            0.78 
1992                  2.20                  1.58            2.53            6.72            2.13            1.07            0.77 
1993                  1.95                  1.39            2.57            6.60            2.11            1.02            0.75 
1994                  1.99                  1.45            2.57            6.34            2.21            0.99            0.76 
1995                  2.04                  1.49            3.31            6.59            2.27            1.00            0.77 
1996                  1.73                  1.38            2.27  6.43            2.49            1.04            0.80 
1997                  1.50                  1.25            2.95            6.36            2.53            1.01            0.91 
1998                  1.43                  1.20     2.95            6.19            2.62            0.89            0.98 
1999                  1.25                  1.11            3.55            8.11            3.28            0.93            1.08 
2000                  1.23        1.09            3.48            5.52            2.62            0.81            1.04 
2003                  1.26 
Data Source: National Center for Education Statistics Fiscal Longitudinal File
Table 5 and Table 6 attempt to adjust for relative need of the KCMSD versus other 
Kansas City metropolitan area districts, a method apparently not employed in the 1998 Cato 
Institute report.  Due to the lay of the land and historical patterns of housing segregation in the 
metropolitan area, the KCMSD had, on average, six to eight times the black population share of 
districts in the metro, more than twice the Hispanic population share, and 2.5 to nearly 3.5 times 
the poverty rate of other districts in the same metro area.  William Duncombe and John Yinger 
identify the additional cost per child qualifying for subsidized lunch at approximately 110% of 
the cost of achieving comparable outcomes for the non low income child.208  Following this 
work, and the application of these findings for need adjustment by Robert Bifulco,209 we apply a 
weight of 1.10 to each child qualifying for free or reduced price lunch as reported in the NCES 
208
 William Duncombe & John Yinger, How Much More Does a Disadvantaged Student Cost?, 24 ECON. OF EDUC. 
REV. 513 (2005).  
209
 Robert Bifulco, District Level Black-White Funding Disparities in the United States: 1987-2002, J. OF EDUC. FIN. 
(forthcoming).  
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fiscal/non-fiscal longitudinal file (aggregated from the public school universe enrollment data).  
Note that we are unable to apply additional adjustments for needs of limited English proficient 
students due to insufficient data on these students for Missouri school districts, and incompatible 
data for Kansas districts. Since our analyses adjust only for poverty-related needs, they should be 
considered conservative. 
Before adjustments are applied, the KCMSD’s instructional spending ratios compared to 
other metro area districts climb to over 150% then decline back to 108%. When adjusted for 
poverty-related needs only, the KCMSD climbs only as high as 120% above other metro area 
districts, but declines to only 76% of other metro area districts by 2000. That is, by 2000, the 
KCMSD actually shows an instructional spending deficit of 24% relative to other districts in the 
Kansas City metropolitan area. 
Table 5
Instructional Expenditures Per Pupil in KCMSD versus Other Kansas City Metro Districts, 
Including Adjustments for Student Poverty
Instruction Not Adjusted for Need Instruction Adjusted for Need
Year CMSA KC KC % CMSA KC KC %
1990 $2,440 $3,163 130% $2,172 $2,211 102%
1991 $2,537 $3,894 153% $2,224 $2,651 119%
1992 $2,760 $4,197 152% $2,365 $2,828 120%
1993 $2,857 $3,788 133% $2,445 $2,530 104%
1994 $2,979 $4,143 139% $2,533 $2,693 106%
1995 $3,064 $4,426 144% $2,619 $2,598 99%
1996 $3,219 $4,325 134% $2,655 $2,764 104%
1997 $3,285 $4,036 123% $2,756 $2,429 88%
1998 $3,412 $3,986 117% $2,883 $2,425 84%
1999 $3,562 $3,845 108% $3,105 $2,333 75%
2000 $3,772 $4,091 108% $3,271 $2,477 76%
Enrollment>2,000 in ADM
Cost adjusted by applying weight of 1.10 per subsidized lunch pupil 
Data Source: National Center for Education Statistics Fiscal Longitudinal File
Table 6 replicates the analysis in Table 5 but with current operating expenditures which 
fold in a portion of the pay-down of capital projects associated with the judicially mandated 
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“desegregative attractiveness” plan.  As indicated previously, before cost adjustments, the 
KCMSD in the early 1990s spent double that of other districts in the Kansas City metro.  By 
2000, that margin had declined to 18% above other districts. When adjusted for poverty alone, 
however, spending peaked at 60% above other districts in the Kansas City metro in 1992 and 
then declined rapidly to only 83% of funding available in other districts by 2000. 
In short, while spending peaked in the early 1990s at levels that should have been more 
than sufficient for closing achievement gaps between average children and poor children 
(assuming conservatively, no other systematically greater educational needs among KCMSD 
students compared with other metro area students), that funding margin declined and did so quite 
rapidly throughout the late 1990s.  By the close of the decade, the KCMSD faced significant 
funding deficits relative to metro area districts, adjusted for the cost of achieving comparable 
outcomes. 
Table 6
Current Expenditures per Pupil in KCMSD versus Other Kansas City Metro Districts, Including 
Adjustments for Student Poverty
Current Not Adjusted for Need Current Adjusted for Need
Year CMSA KC KC % CMSA KC KC %
1990 $3,948 $6,557 166% $3,504 $4,584 131%
1991 $4,120 $7,867 191% $3,602 $5,357 149%
1992 $4,387 $8,926 203% $3,754 $6,016 160%
1993 $4,585 $8,211 179% $3,916 $5,486 140%
1994 $4,822 $8,809 183% $4,088 $5,725 140%
1995 $4,963 $9,436 190% $4,229 $5,538 131%
1996 $5,198 $8,495 163% $4,272 $5,429 127%
1997 $5,407 $7,688 142% $4,524 $4,626 102%
1998 $5,656 $7,676 136% $4,766 $4,669 98%
1999 $5,929 $7,093 120% $5,155 $4,304 83%
2000 $6,301 $7,449 118% $5,450 $4,510 83%
Enrollment>2,000 in ADM
Cost adjusted by applying weight of 1.10 per subsidized lunch pupil (See Bifulco, 2005)
Data Source: National Center for Education Statistics Fiscal Longitudinal File
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B. Premise #2: Did the State of Missouri Cover a Disproportionate Share of the Costs of the 
Desegregation Plan?
In this empirical analysis, we address whether the state of Missouri covered most of the 
costs of the KCMSD desegregation plan.  We begin with a discussion of the additional annual 
operating aid raised through the state school finance formula. We conclude with a brief analysis 
of total revenues per pupil in the KCMSD, including additional capital funds raised for new 
construction and renovation, a centerpiece of the desegregation plan and flashpoint for the 
conservative critique. 
The state of Missouri has long used a matching aid formula for distributed state revenues 
to local school districts.  In Missouri, state aid for general operating budgets is pegged primarily 
to the local tax rate adopted by local voters via direct referenda.  As previously discussed, 
matching aid ratios are determined by the ratio of each district’s taxable assessed property value 
per pupil compared to the state guaranteed assessed valuation per pupil.  If a district’s own 
assessed value per pupil is approximately 50% of the state guarantee, that district would receive 
in state aid, $1 for each dollar raised from local property taxes.  An additional multiplier was 
added in the 1990s to adjust matching aid amounts by differences in district income.  In addition, 
student need adjustments were added.  Nonetheless, the primary determinant of total state and 
local revenue per pupil above and beyond that generated by a $1.25 rate (early 1990s) or $2.75 
rate (later 1990s to present) is the tax rate approved by local voters, or in the case of Kansas City, 
the tax rate mandated by Judge Clark. 
Also as previously discussed, despite concurrent state school finance litigation and 
subsequent modifications to the state school finance system (most notably, increasing the 
minimum tax rate and including poverty based adjustments to aid), no significant structural 
changes were made to the Missouri school finance formula until 2005.  Rather, just as Judge 
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Clark chose to work within the perceived constraints of the Milliken decisions, state legislators 
also chose to work within the constraints of existing state school finance policies.  By raising the 
KCMSD’s local tax rate to $4.95, KCMSD would generate $7,425 per pupil in state and local 
revenue before income and student need adjustment rather than the minimum $4,125.  At a 50% 
matching rate (close to that of KCMSD), this would generate $126 million in total state aid per 
year (.5 x 7,425 = 3,713 x 34,000 students = 126,225,000) or about $63 million more than would 
have been generated at the late 1990s minimum tax of $2.75. 
Table 7 summarizes local revenue per pupil generated by the KCMSD’s actual court 
imposed tax rate compared with what the district would have raised locally had it only been 
required to levy the current state average tax rate from 1999 to 2003.  KCMSD residents were 
forced to raise $1,200 to $1,300 more per pupil than they would have been, had they imposed the 
state average local tax rate. 
Table 7
Assessed Value per Pupil, Operating Levies and Local Revenue under Alternative Assumptions
Assessed Value per Pupil Operating Levy Local Revenue per Pupil







1999  $      59,421  $          65,121            3.21            4.60          2,996           2,090 
2000  $      63,586  $          68,687            3.24            4.95          3,400           2,222 
2001  $      66,122  $          72,027            3.27            4.95          3,565           2,352 
2002  $      72,049  $          77,762            3.28            4.95          3,849           2,551 
2003  $      73,768  $          75,186            3.34            4.95          3,722           2,508 
As seen in Table 7, the KCMSD has a slightly stronger than average property tax base, 
meaning that on average, KCMSD residents will pay a higher share of school revenue than 
districts statewide.  Table 8 summarizes current expenditures per pupil, local revenue per pupil 
and local revenue shares of current expenditures for the KCMSD and all other Missouri school 
49
districts.  On average, while the KCMSD had much higher current operating expenditures per 
pupil than other districts statewide, KCMSD residents also paid a larger share of the total cost.  
Indeed, by the basic structure of the Missouri aid formula, this larger share was warranted. 
Table 8
Current Expenditures Per Pupil and Local Revenue Shares
Local Revenue per Pupil
Current Expenditures 
per Pupil
Share of Current 
Expenditures
Year Non-KC KC Non-KC KC Non-KC Share KC-Share
1999  $        1,920  $            2,996  $      5,269  $      7,199 36.4% 41.6%
2000  $        2,063  $            3,400  $      5,616  $      7,680 36.7% 44.3%
2001  $        2,165  $            3,565  $      6,008  $      8,642 36.0% 41.3%
2002  $        2,357  $            3,849  $      6,388  $      9,494 36.9% 40.5%
2003  $        2,460  $            3,722  $      6,622  $      8,659 37.1% 43.0%
Table 9 reveals one final feature of Missouri’s existing school finance formula that leads 
to substantial reductions in aid to the KCMSD relative to other districts statewide.  Missouri is 
among a handful of states that continues to provide aid to local public school districts on the 
basis of their average daily attendance (ADA) rather than enrolled pupil count or membership.  
From 2000 to 2004, poverty rates and black student population share alone explain 59% of 
variations in attendance rates across Missouri school districts enrolling over 2,000 students. Both 
black population share and poverty rate are strongly associated with lower attendance rates, 
leading to systematically lower funding per eligible or enrolled pupil in districts with higher 
shares of either population.  Table 9 shows that, in 1999, while districts on average (excluding 
the KCMSD), lost 5.6% of state aid due to differences between enrollment and ADA, KCMSD 
lost nearly 13%. That margin has closed over time as the KCMSD had improved its attendance 
rates. Nonetheless, the KCMSD continues to receive a lower share of state aid due to ADA based 
funding than other districts with lower poverty rates and smaller Black populations. 
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Table 9
Funding Reduction Effect of Providing Aid on the Basis of Average Daily Attendance
State Revenue per ADA State Revenue per Pupil
% Loss due to ADA 
Count
Year Non-KC KC Non-KC KC Non-KC KC
1999  $        2,103  $            4,065  $      1,986  $      3,539 5.6% 12.9%
2000  $        2,216  $            3,473  $      2,081  $      3,118 6.1% 10.2%
2001  $        2,367  $            3,895  $      2,226  $      3,594 6.0% 7.7%
2002  $        2,408  $            3,924 $      2,289  $      3,633 4.9% 7.4%
2003  $        2,488  $            2,890  $      2,369  $      2,737 4.8% 5.3%
Adopting the logic of the federal district court in Missouri, many modern school finance 
adequacy complaints might be resolved by simply requiring high need, inadequately funded 
urban districts to levy sufficient property taxes to cover on their own, the cost of achieving 
adequate outcomes.  Perhaps the most obvious extension of this logic applies to the proposed $5 
billion price tag for the State of New York to resolve school funding inadequacies in New York 
City, which enrolls over 1/3 of that state’s students. 
Some might argue that large urban centers like New York or the KCMSD or New York 
City might have sufficient non-residential tax base and/or sufficient high income residents who 
either have no children or privately school them, such that the city’s poor families whose 
children attend public schools would not pay disproportionately for remedies.  Indeed, the 
commercial and industrial tax base and wealth of families without children in the KCMSD 
schools does provide some buffer.  Nonetheless, in 2003, the median voter (in a housing unit of 
median value and with median household income), in Missouri paid 1.25% of income in school 
operating tax levy. In the 95%ile district, the median voter paid 1.75% and in the KCMSD, 
1.85%.  
Arguably, the judicial imposition of the KCMSD’s elevated tax rate has inhibited the 
district from initiating funding inadequacy claims against the state, or achieving sufficient 
legislative sympathy to lead to favorable school finance reform absent litigation.  Common 
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public misperceptions are that (1) the KCMSD is flush with financial resources; and (2) the 
KCMSD has garnered, for the past 25 years, a disproportionate and unfair share of state 
resources. Yet, neither claim is necessarily true.  As indicated previously, in recent years, the 
KCMSD’s resource margin has all but disappeared, and when adjusting for need, the KCMSD 
faces a significant resource deficit relative to other districts in the Kansas City metro area.  
Second, the KCMSD has paid the same share of its state and local revenues as would any other 
district in the state of similar taxable wealth, income and poverty, with similar tax rate.  Indeed, 
with its higher tax rate and overall size, the district does consume a significant share of the 
state’s education funding.  The same, however, can be said of some of the state’s larger suburban 
school districts who have taken advantage of matching aid for levies above the $2.75 rate and 
have done so at a rapidly increasing pace in recent years. 
Figure 2 addresses the state share of total revenues per pupil for the KCMSD, relative to 
the rest of the state of Missouri, through the 1990s. The facilities plan component of the Jenkins
remedies came at a total cost of around $540 million.210 To contextualize that number, first 
consider that new school facilities or substantially renovated ones should last for approximately 
30 years.  As such, the value of the $540 million may spread out to about $18 million per year. 
Across about 30,000 students per year, that value comes to about $600 per pupil, or about 5% of 
per pupil revenues in peak years. As such, while $540 million sounds like a great deal of money, 
and while it was to be expended over a shorter period than 30 years, the per pupil value over the 
30-year period of that expense appears more modest and more realistic. 
With the short-term increase in total revenue, including revenue for capital projects, the 
state’s share of total revenue in the KCMSD climbed to between 50% and 55% during peak 
years (1992 to 1998). By 2000, the state share had dipped back below 45%. During that period, 
210 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 78.  
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the district’s total annual revenue ranged from about $320 to $450 million.  If the expected share 
to be covered by the state was closer to 40% instead of 55%, in the peak year of revenue 
generating, the state share would have been $180 million (40% x $450 million). At 55% the 
state share of $450 million would be $247.5 million, or 67.5 million more than expected. If 
divided evenly across the state’s 867,000 students in 1996 (includes only K-12 districts), that 
would amount to about $78 per pupil that might have been spent on all Missouri children rather 
than KCMSD children, or approximately 1.3% over the average district level total revenue per 
pupil in that year ($5,866). That is, measured very generously, increased allocations of state 
support to the KCMSD above and beyond the expected state share absent Jenkins remedies, 
resulted in a potential decrease of statewide funding by about 1.3% per pupil. It is conceivable, 
though unlikely that this 1.3% difference, never promised to districts statewide, could have been 
sufficient to reinstate some of the cancelled field trips and extra-curricular activities that other 
districts claimed had been eliminated because of the state’s obligations to KCMSD.
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Figure 2
























C.  Premise #3: Was the KCMSD a Largely Inefficient School District?
Unfortunately, sufficient student outcome data were not available for the period of peak 
spending in the early to mid-1990s.  Outcome data were, however, available for the period over 
which the KCMSD eventually achieved unitary status (2003).  In this section, we explore the 
relative productive and cost efficiency of the KCMSD based on a statewide analysis but focusing 
our comparisons herein on districts in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Productive efficiency 
evaluates whether, given their current resource levels, regional costs and student population 
characteristics, school districts produce student outcomes at the expected level, or exceed or fail 
54
to meet expectations. Alternatively, cost efficiency evaluates whether, given roughly the same 
sets of conditions, districts appear to be overspending to achieve given levels of outcomes. 
Criticisms made by conservatives seem to have centered on simple measures of how well, 
on average, minority children in the KCMSD performed on standardized assessments and how 
they compared with other students statewide.  It is indeed relevant to evaluate performance of 
poor minority children attending the KCMSD compared to non-poor, non-minority children 
throughout the state.  Under consideration were measures of raw output, or production, and 
ideally, the students in the KCMSD should be provided equal opportunity to produce outcomes 
at comparable levels.  It does not stand to reason, however, that when children in the district do 
not produce at comparably high levels, despite what would appear to be substantial funding, that 
the district is necessarily inefficient.  One must more carefully and statistically rigorously 
evaluate what could be expected of these children, under these circumstances, receiving a 
specific level of resources.
Recall in a previous section that we used a poverty cost adjustment of 1.1 (110% above 
the cost for the average child) per child in poverty to reflect the higher costs of achieving a given 
set of outcomes with children from impoverished backgrounds. The logic behind the analysis in 
this section is similar.  Rather than drawing cost adjustments from extant literature, we estimate 
statistical models of the outcome levels that can be expected, given demographic differences 
among students and spending differences.  Alternatively, we estimate the expected costs of 
achieving current outcome levels, given student population differences. 
For the following analysis, we estimate technical efficiency of production and cost 
efficiency of Missouri’s scale efficient public school districts, enrolling over 2,000 students.  We 
focus on scale efficient districts – those large enough to enjoy economies of scale and those at 
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the same time, large enough to have enough annual test takers to yield more reliable year to year 
performance outcomes. 
Productive efficiency estimation places a student outcome measure as the dependent 
variable, in this case district’s Missouri Assessment Program (MAP) Index score, and may 
include a lagged measure of the outcome variable, one period earlier as one predictor, along with 
a collection of student and schooling inputs and potential structural constraints of schools.  We 
apply models both with, and without the lagged performance measure.  We specify our model as
follows:
MAP = b0 + b1MAPt-1 + b2Year + b3CurexpADA + b4Enrollment + b5Enrollment2 + 
b6FRLunch + b7Black + b8Disability + b7TeachCost + e
Where MAP refers to each district’s MAP index score, MAPt-1 refers to the 1 period 
lagged MAP index score (used in one set of models), Year refers to the year of the data, where 
the data set includes data from 2000 to 2005, CurexpADA refers to the districts’ current 
expenditures per student in average daily attendance, Enrollment refers to district total 
enrollment (and enrollment squared), FRLunch refers to the percent of children receiving free or 
reduced price lunch, Black refers to the district percent black, Disability refers to the district 
percent of children in special education programs, and TeachCost refers to the relative cost of a 
teacher at specific degree level and years of experience in each U.S. Census Core Based 
Statistical Area across Missouri (compared to rural outlying areas).211
Cost efficiency estimation places districts current expenditures as the dependent variable 
in an education cost function. Costs are assumed to be a function of current outcome levels, 
211
 Estimated via a Core Based Statistical Area fixed effects model using teacher level data on about 62,000 to 
65,000 teachers per year from 1998 to 2005 across the state of Missouri. The model was specified as:  Wage = 
f(year, degree level, experience, CBSA). 
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student population characteristics, district structural characteristics and geographic variations in 
the prices of schooling inputs. 
CurexpADA = b0 + b1MAP + b2 MAPt-1 + b3Year + b4Enrollment +b5Enrollment2 + b6FreeLunch 
+ b7Black + b8Disability + b7TeachCost + e
Where CurexpADA has been moved to the position of the dependent variable and student 
outcomes (MAP) and lagged outcomes are included as independent (though endogenous) 
variables. 
With the cost function, one can predict via any number of statistical or numerical 
maximization methods, the “cost” of achieving current outcomes under current conditions.  
Actual expenditures to achieve those outcomes, under current conditions may be more than 
underlying costs. As with production modeling, a portion of that difference can be assumed to be 
inefficiency, while other portions may include random error (perhaps created by measurement 
error among inputs or outcomes) and omitted variables. 
The two broad categories of empirical methods for investigating school or district 
efficiency are regression based methods (Corrected Ordinary Least Squares and Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis) and numerical maximization methods (Data Envelopment Analysis). 212
212
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Unfortunately, recent research suggests that district inefficiency is difficult to measure with great 
precision and accuracy, regardless of empirical method.213
These methodological caveats in mind, to estimate technical efficiency of production and 
cost efficiency, we apply Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).  SFA decomposes the residual 
(difference between predicted cost and actual spending) of the cost function into two components 
– a random error term and cost inefficiency term.  SFA fits a frontier model, or model across the 
most cost efficient (or productive efficient) districts in the sample, rather than fitting a model of 
average efficiency.  SFA requires the researcher to specify the distribution of the random error 
term, which is most often assumed to be normal/half-normal (because districts can be only less 
than maximum efficiency). 
Statistical software packages including STATA 9.0 produce estimates of relative cost or 
technical efficiency. Cost efficiency estimates assign the perfectly cost efficient district a value 
of 1.0, with less efficient districts (those having larger residuals after removing the error term), 
assigned higher values. Productive efficiency indices also assign a value of 1.0 for perfect 
(100%) efficiency, but then express as decimals, reductions to 100% efficiency.  For clarity, we 
also compare predicted performance levels with actual, and predicted cost levels with actual, 
with recognition that the differences between predicted and actual values include both 
“inefficiency” and random error. 
Table 10 summarizes key variables over school districts in the Kansas City, Missouri 
Core Based Statistical Area.  Table 11 summarizes the predicted and actual cost and performance 
levels of Kansas City area (Missouri only) districts, including efficiency indices for alternative 
models. Districts are sorted from least to most cost efficient. Two emerging minority population 
213
 Robert Bifulco & William Duncombe, Evaluating School Performance: Are We Ready for Prime Time?, in 
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districts, Grandview and Center school district appear less efficient than the KCMSD. Center 
School district, originally founded as a post-Brown segregated enclave, is now approaching 
black concentration levels of the KCMSD, is spending more per pupil than the KCMSD and is 
predicted to need less per pupil to achieve its current level of outcomes. As such, the inefficiency 
margin for Center is greater than that of the KCMSD. In productive efficiency, without a lagged 
performance measure, Center is slightly more efficient than the KCMSD, at 97.7% compared to 
97.0%. Grandview, however, is both less cost efficient and less productive efficient than the 
KCMSD. Indeed the raw output of Grandview is higher, at a MAP index of 176, compared to the 
KCMSD’s 161. And, Grandview’s expenditure per ADA is lower than the KCMSD at $8,020 
compared to $9,594. However, the models predict that Grandview, given its less needy 
population, should be able to achieve their MAP index of 176 with $5,992 per pupil, or 
conversely, at $8,020 per pupil should be able to achieve a MAP index of 189.37.  
On productive efficiency, excluding lagged performance (which removes most existing 
variance), several districts miss their predicted mark by wider margins than the KCMSD. These 
include Belton, Excelsior Springs, Raymore-Peculiar, Raytown and Hickman Mills. Grandview, 
Excelsior Springs and Hickman Mills were also identified as marginally less efficient than other 
districts in the model including lagged performance. 
Needless to say, even in its own metropolitan area, the KCMSD is not necessarily a 
standout on inefficiency. As such, it is difficult to believe that the KCMSD is an appropriate 
national poster-child for inefficient school district expenditure, at least in the last five years.  
Note that Hickman Mills’ raw performance outcomes are only marginally better than those of the 
KCMSD, despite serving far fewer children in poverty, but similar black concentration. 
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Table 10




Percent Black Percent 
Disability
Enrollment Teacher Cost 
Index
KEARNEY R-I 5.7% 0.5% 11.6% 3195 1.128
BLUE SPRINGS R-IV 9.1% 5.2% 11.8% 12716 1.128
ODESSA R-VII 25.5% 1.9% 13.4% 2337 1.128
PLATTE CO. R-III 13.6% 3.6% 10.9% 2171 1.128
RAYTOWN C-2 30.7% 29.7% 11.7% 8461 1.128
LEE'S SUMMIT R-VII 7.7% 5.6% 12.3% 14597 1.128
NORTH KANSAS CITY 74 24.0% 6.1% 14.4% 16940 1.128
HICKMAN MILLS C-1 52.7% 69.3% 14.7% 7392 1.128
RAYMORE-PECULIAR R-II 12.7% 2.8% 8.5% 4455 1.128
HARRISONVILLE R-IX 22.2% 1.2% 10.3% 2338 1.128
PARK HILL 13.1% 6.1% 14.1% 9165 1.128
BELTON 124 26.9% 5.0% 11.5% 4594 1.128
FORT OSAGE R-I 32.2% 4.9% 16.8% 4845 1.128
EXCELSIOR SPRINGS 40 26.4% 2.5% 11.5% 2975 1.128
LIBERTY 53 11.6% 4.0% 11.2% 7087 1.128
INDEPENDENCE 30 34.5% 5.4% 15.7% 11198 1.128
KANSAS CITY 33 76.8% 69.7% 11.5% 30272 1.128
GRANDVIEW C-4 41.6% 49.9% 12.9% 4222 1.128
CENTER 58 52.1% 57.9% 15.2% 2594 1.128
60
Table 11


























CENTER 58 183.12 177.36 177.21 0.977210 0.999848 $6,905 $9,676 1.356
GRANDVIEW C-4 189.37 177.84 176.08 0.963534 0.999847 $5,992 $8,020 1.314
KANSAS CITY 33 171.03 162.17 161.87 0.970443 0.999848 $7,148 $9,594 1.310
INDEPENDENCE 30 200.10 193.64 192.64 0.976100 0.999848 $5,478 $7,324 1.297
LIBERTY 53 213.37 207.08 207.42 0.978719 0.999848 $5,281 $6,780 1.271
EXCELSIOR SPRINGS 40 203.63 189.74 187.54 0.959418 0.999847 $4,715 $6,082 1.265
FORT OSAGE R-I 199.53 191.49 189.98 0.972588 0.999848 $5,351 $6,918 1.257
BELTON 124 203.23 189.39 189.23 0.964364 0.999848 $4,749 $5,966 1.254
PARK HILL 210.94 205.98 205.88 0.979757 0.999848 $5,723 $7,294 1.248
HARRISONVILLE R-IX 205.84 197.95 198.03 0.975767 0.999848 $5,008 $6,199 1.220
RAYMORE-PECULIAR R-II 211.89 196.64 196.39 0.962522 0.999848 $4,622 $5,697 1.207
HICKMAN MILLS C-1 179.29 164.84 162.89 0.954032 0.999847 $6,376 $7,756 1.197
NORTH KANSAS CITY 74 203.86 195.92 195.54 0.974919 0.999848 $5,765 $6,999 1.196
LEE'S SUMMIT R-VII 213.29 209.71 209.49 0.981265 0.999848 $5,908 $6,925 1.169
RAYTOWN C-2 197.07 187.12 186.05 0.969726 0.999848 $5,538 $6,487 1.165
PLATTE CO. R-III 208.44 201.96 203.14 0.979212 0.999848 $5,374 $6,240 1.156
ODESSA R-VII 200.77 192.05 190.79 0.971681 0.999848 $5,180 $5,815 1.140
BLUE SPRINGS R-IV 212.31 209.13 209.15 0.981928 0.999848 $5,683 $6,442 1.137
KEARNEY R-I 210.79 200.70 200.89 0.972545 0.999848 $5,097 $5,182 1.077
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D.  Summarizing the Empirical Critique
Contrary to the assertions of conservative critics, it turns out that the KCMSD outspent 
all other major metropolitan districts in only one year – 1992 – based on either unadjusted or 
regionally cost adjusted analysis of either current operating expenditures or current instructional 
expenditures per pupil.  While spending peaked at 76% above average (1995) for those districts, 
by 2000, the KCMSD spent only 12% above average in current operating expenditures and only 
2% above average in instructional expenditures.  That is, peak funding lasted for a relatively 
short period of time. Relative to schools in the Kansas City metropolitan area, the spending edge 
was larger, at 2 to 1 over the average during the early 1990s. Again, by 2000 that margin had 
declined substantially to only 23% above average in current expenditures and only 9% above 
average in instructional expenditures.  When adjusted for poverty related need, the KCMSD had 
only 83% of average current expenditures and only 76% of average instructional expenditures 
among large districts in its metropolitan area. 
Despite the regional belief that the financial woes of all other school districts in out-state 
Missouri are primarily a function of disproportionate sums of state resources allocated 
specifically to the KCMSD, the district’s property tax payers consistently paid a much higher 
share of the district’s state and local operating revenue than other districts across the state. 
Further, the effects of redistributing statewide additional state revenues awarded to KCMSD 
would have been relatively small ($78 per pupil at the highest).
Finally, regarding productive or cost efficiency, with specific emphasis on the Missouri 
Assessment Program, the KCMSD is neither the most, nor the least efficient district in the 
immediate metropolitan area, no less the entire state.  However, given that these analyses were 
conducted over a period where the KCMSD’s relative spending position had sunk to lower than 
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its relative position in 1968 and much lower than 1993, it is likely that the KCMSD’s current 
productive and cost efficiency position are better than they might have been if estimated from 
1992 to 1995.  While spending peaked at relatively high levels during this period, it is difficult to 
conceive that student outcomes could be substantially positively affected, at whatever level of 
spending, in the time it takes for one cohort of students to move only from the 2nd to the 5th 
grade. 
It is necessary to ask how the premises upon which the conservative critique is based 
could be so distorted.  The first problem is that the conservative critique fails to take into account 
the history of the KCMSD and the state of Missouri.  We have observed that the residential 
structure and demographics of the KCMSD were carefully crafted by city officials and real estate 
developers into racially segregated enclaves for the first 60 years of the 20th century.  We have 
also noted that in the 1960s, the KCMSD was a relatively high spending district, but because of 
the school funding system’s reliance on property taxation and the KCMSD’s racial and socio-
economic composition, the district would be soon be unable to meet its educational needs.  
Moreover, we explained that Judge Clark responded to the KCMSD’s financial concerns in the 
Jenkins litigation by imposing an extremely high property tax rate on the district.  We have 
further explained that the state legislature adopted the court-imposed tax rate to settle the 
KCMSD desegregation suit and that this high tax burden became part of the state school finance 
formula.  
When considering these factors, it is easy to understand how by 2000, the KCMSD was 
in its weakest relative position in school funding since prior to the 1960s.  It is also easy to 
understand that the Jenkins litigation only temporarily shifted the KCMSD’s relative funding 
levels compared with either a national peer group of metropolitan districts or a local labor market
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peer group.  Moreover, it becomes clear that because of the KCMSD’s disproportionate tax 
burden, district residents have shouldered a higher tax burden than residents of other Missouri 
school districts.  
The second flaw with the conservative critique is that fails to provide a context for the 
funds spent of the KCMSD desegregation plan.  Critics cite the statistics the KCMSD spent more 
than $11,000 per pupil and that $2 billion were spent on the desegregation plan as evidence of 
exorbitant spending.  When taken out of context, these numbers appear huge.  However, our 
analysis reveals that the KCMSD was a very high spending district for no more than five years, 
or the time in which one cohort of children is able to progress through five grade levels in the 
district.  Further, when adjusted for student needs, the KCMSD’s funding dropped below the 
metropolitan area average by 1998.  This is hardly enough time to erase the generational poverty 
of the KCMSD or alter the residential structure and demographics of a school district that had 
been designed to be racially segregated until the 1960s. 
CONCLUSIONS
In school finance litigation, a number of courts have held a correlation between 
educational funding and educational outcomes.  Conservative critiques have asserted that the 
KCMSD desegregation case clearly establishes that no such correlation exists.  Their critique is 
based on three premises: (1) the KCMSD received more money over an extended period than 
other school districts; (2) the state of Missouri covered a disproportionate share of the costs of 
the desegregation plan, to the detriment of school districts throughout the rest of the state; and 
(3) the exorbitant spending on KCMSD was largely inefficient, leading to no improvement in 
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educational outcomes.  However, our empirical analysis does not support these claims.  Thus, the 
KCMSD experience should not be cited as proof that “money doesn’t matter” with respect to 
academic outcomes.  There are two reasons for this lack of support: (1) the conservative critique 
fails to consider the educational history of the state of Missouri and the KCMSD; and (2) the 
critique analyzes spending out of context.  
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Appendix A: Ordinary Least Squares and Stochastic Frontier Efficiency 
Regressions
Models Underlying Predicted Values & Efficiency Estimates in Table 11
Table A1: Productive Efficiency Model without Lagged Performance
OLS SFA
Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Year
2001 -0.014 0.005 0.003 -0.014 0.004 0.002
2002 -0.014 0.005 0.002 -0.014 0.005 0.002
2003 -0.008 0.005 0.116 -0.007 0.005 0.120
2004 0.000 0.005 0.941 0.001 0.005 0.877
Current Spending per ADA (ln) 0.079 0.010 0.000 0.080 0.010 0.000
Enrollment (ln) 0.164 0.047 0.001 0.168 0.047 0.000
Enrollment (ln) Squared -0.009 0.003 0.001 -0.009 0.003 0.000
Demographics
Percent Free/Reduced Lunch -0.218 0.015 0.000 -0.220 0.015 0.000
Percent Black -0.127 0.012 0.000 -0.125 0.012 0.000
Percent Disability -0.371 0.022 0.000 -0.375 0.022 0.000
CBSA Teacher Wage Fixed Effect -0.104 0.017 0.000 -0.104 0.016 0.000
Intercept 4.113 0.244 0.000 4.103 0.242 0.000
R-squared 0.806
Table A2: Productive Efficiency Models with Lagged Performance
OLS SFA
Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>z
MAP Index Lagged 1 Period (ln) 0.893 0.029 0.000 0.893 0.029 0.000
Year
2001 -0.014 0.003 0.000 -0.010 0.002 0.000
2002 -0.004 0.003 0.104 0.006 0.002 0.011
2003 0.002 0.003 0.409
2004 0.004 0.003 0.098
Current Spending per ADA (ln) 0.007 0.007 0.297 0.007 0.007 0.289
Enrollment (ln) 0.024 0.030 0.412 0.024 0.029 0.405
Enrollment (ln) Squared -0.001 0.002 0.445 -0.001 0.002 0.438
Demographics
Percent Free/Reduced Lunch -0.018 0.011 0.119 -0.018 0.011 0.113
Percent Black -0.017 0.008 0.042 -0.017 0.008 0.038
Percent Disability -0.023 0.018 0.206 -0.023 0.018 0.199
CBSA Teacher Wage Fixed Effect -0.006 0.011 0.581 -0.006 0.011 0.575
Intercept 0.411 0.194 0.034 0.407 0.190 0.033
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R-squared 0.940
Table A3: Cost Efficiency Models
OLS SFA
Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>z
MAP Index (ln) 0.379 0.363 0.297 0.431 0.337 0.201
MAP Index Lagged 1 Period (ln) 0.980 0.384 0.011 0.702 0.360 0.051
Enrollment (ln) -1.243 0.208 0.000 -1.204 0.207 0.000
Enrollment (ln) Squared 0.071 0.012 0.000 0.070 0.012 0.000
Demographics
Percent Free/Reduced Lunch -0.089 0.083 0.284 -0.076 0.077 0.318
Percent Black 0.708 0.050 0.000 0.629 0.050 0.000
Percent Disability 2.251 0.069 0.000 2.246 0.072 0.000
CBSA Teacher Wage Fixed Effect 0.223 0.080 0.006 0.130 0.070 0.062
Year
2001 -0.087 0.019 0.000 -0.055 0.017 0.001
2002 -0.028 0.019 0.139
2003 0.008 0.018 0.674 0.032 0.017 0.059
2004 0.024 0.017 0.163
Intercept 6.385 1.386 0.000 7.303 1.365 0.000
R-squared 0.852
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